

# Impotence of Oversight Architecture

## A Systemic Analysis of Institutional Failure and Executive Insulation in Western Australian Local Government

### Part I: Executive Summary & The Structural Flaw

The fundamental weakness of Western Australian local government oversight is not a failure of personnel, but an inadequate design feature of its legislated architecture. Under the Local Government Act 1995 (WA), a local government is established as a body corporate. This statutory construction creates a profound governance anomaly: it grants the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) near-absolute operational and employment monopolies, effectively decoupling the administrative machinery from genuine democratic accountability. While the elected Council is theoretically the governing body, it is structurally starved of independent information and lacks the legal mechanisms required to direct, audit, or discipline the bureaucracy.

The oversight ecosystem fails because it is highly fragmented, siloed, and reactive. No single agency possesses a holistic mandate to actively intervene, audit, and correct systemic administrative overreach, report curation, or cultural decay. Instead, a sophisticated executive administration out-manoeuvres the regulatory network by operating within the vast statutory blind spots between these disconnected agencies. Recent legislative reforms have exacerbated this failure; they focus intensely on policing the behaviour of individual elected councillors via a standardized, state-backed Model Code of Conduct, while leaving the systemic monopoly of the unelected executive untouched.

This narrow legislative focus introduces a profound structural distortion across the sector. Rather than establishing a unified ethical baseline, the architecture fragments local government personnel into at least six distinct classes of persons governed by separate, isolated codes of conduct (Elected Councillors, Committee Members, Election Candidates, the CEO, Staff Employees, and Contractors/Volunteers). Because the Public Sector Management Act 1994 explicitly excludes local governments from the definition of a public sector body, there is no direct state-enforced public sector Code of Ethics binding these groups. Instead, this fragmented landscape creates highly mixed and unequal standards: the state rigidly polices the tone and public scrutiny of elected politicians, while the CEO retains absolute, un-audited discretion to write, modify, and enforce the code governing internal staff. This structural imbalance leaves the system wide open to prejudice and tactical weaponisation; a sophisticated executive can continuously shift internal administrative rules to shield its own operations and insulate itself from transparency, while framing any rigorous, adversarial interrogation by a councillor or whistleblower as a punishable behavioural breach.

### Part II: Deconstruction of the Oversight Architecture

The table below ranks the Western Australian local government oversight network by **Structural Impotence**. It categorizes each agency based on its tier, its specific structural blind spot, and its sector-specific vulnerability to executive capture..

|   | Agency / Framework                                                            | Regulatory / Strategic Tier                | Core Architectural Blind Spot                                                                                                                                                                               | Sector-Specific Vulnerability to Executive Capture                                                                                                                                                                 |
|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | <b>DLGSC / Local Government Inspector</b>                                     | Primary Frontline Regulator                | <b>Passive Process Auditing</b><br>Relies on self-reported compliance returns signed off by CEOs. Lacks a proactive field-investigation force. Measures volume of processed files over democratic outcomes. | <b>"Revolving Door" Effect</b><br>Fluid movement of personnel between the department, peak bodies, and administrations dilutes regulatory distance, converting enforcement into informal negotiation.              |
| 2 | <b>Public Sector Commission (PSC)</b>                                         | Integrity & Ethics Backstop                | <b>Devolved Accountability</b><br>Mandated to monitor misconduct but lacks field investigators. Automatically chutes complaints back to the target agency's CEO for self-investigation.                     | <b>Employment Monopoly Loophole</b><br>Because the CEO controls all staff careers, internal governance teams and whistleblowers are structurally disincentivised from cooperating with devolved reviews.           |
| 3 | <b>Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) / FOI</b>                     | Frontline Transparency Arbiter             | <b>Resource &amp; Time Asymmetries</b><br>Severe operational backlogs mean external reviews of disputed document access take up to two years, destroying the data's utility.                                | <b>Tactical Information Starvation</b><br>Executives use ratepayer-funded legal teams to apply broad exemptions (e.g., commercial confidence), blocking councillors and citizens until decisions are irreversible. |
| 4 | <b>Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC)</b>                                  | Supreme Anti-Corruption Body               | <b>High Evidentiary Threshold</b><br>Statutorily restricted to investigating "serious misconduct" that crosses criminal thresholds or carries a two-year prison sentence.                                   | <b>"Sub-Criminal" Void</b><br>Completely blind to lawful but highly biased administrative manoeuvres, such as the deliberate curation or filtering of information in executive reports to Council.                 |
| 5 | <b>State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) &amp; Planning/Building Frameworks</b> | Specialized Administrative & Merits Review | <b>Merits Blindness to Process</b><br>Reviews decisions <i>de novo</i> , but its jurisdiction is strictly bound by technical text. It cannot audit background executive bias or report falsification.       | <b>RAR Evidence Gatekeeper</b><br>Executives hold a total monopoly over writing Responsible Authority Reports (RARs). SAT reviews the technical correctness of the output, legally cleansing the curated input.    |

|    | <b>Agency / Framework</b>                                                               | <b>Regulatory / Strategic Tier</b>       | <b>Core Architectural Blind Spot</b>                                                                                                                                                        | <b>Sector-Specific Vulnerability to Executive Capture</b>                                                                                                                                                                |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 6  | <b>Department of Water &amp; Environmental Regulation (DWER) / Dept of Health (DoH)</b> | Environmental & Public Health Protection | <b>Fragmented Statutory Delegation</b><br>Day-to-day enforcement, monitoring, and site licensing are heavily delegated down to the council's internal Environmental Health Officers (EHOs). | <b>"Dual-Hat" Conflict</b><br>Because EHOs are employees subordinate to the CEO, they are structurally disincentivised from aggressively enforcing state health or contamination regulations against their own employer. |
| 7  | <b>WorkSafe WA</b>                                                                      | Specialized Workplace Safety Regulator   | <b>Narrow Industrial Axis</b><br>Empowered strictly to enforce physical and psychosocial occupational safety frameworks within defined workplace forms, blind to political dynamics.        | <b>Safety Inversion Fortress</b><br>Broad psychosocial hazard codes and extra-legislative "volunteer registration" barriers are co-opted by executives to issue communication bans and lock out critics.                 |
| 8  | <b>Office of the Auditor General (OAG)</b>                                              | Financial & Performance Audit            | <b>Retrospective Scope</b><br>Possesses immense power to uncover operational and fiscal inefficiencies, but acts only as a retrospective historian long after funds are spent.              | <b>Absence of Coercive Correction</b><br>Unlike state departments tied to Treasury controls, independent ratepayer revenue allows local executives to ignore OAG performance critiques without fiscal penalty.           |
| 9  | <b>Office of the Western Australian Ombudsman</b>                                       | Parliamentary Administrative Review      | <b>Procedural Correctness Trap</b><br>Bound to evaluate surface-level compliance. If a perfect paper trail exists, it validates the process, remaining blind to hidden manipulation.        | <b>Endorsement Inversion Loop</b><br>The CEO weaponizes the Ombudsman's narrow "procedural compliance" findings to convince the PSC and DLGSC to permanently close behavioural integrity files.                          |
| 10 | <b>WA Local Government Association (WALGA)</b>                                          | Member Advocacy Body & Private Union     | <b>Zero State Regulatory Power</b><br>Holds no legal authority over the sector, yet sits at the absolute centre of its political, educational, and advisory architecture.                   | <b>Institutional Shield</b><br>Funded by ratepayer-derived subscriptions, it functions as an employer union that co-authors state guidelines to soften compliance hooks and preserve executive autonomy.                 |

## **Part III: The Illusion of Reform (Analysis of Recent Legislative Updates)**

Recent and ongoing reforms to the *Local Government Act* are promoted by the State Government as a tightening of accountability. In reality, chapter discoveries reveal they exacerbate systemic weakness through three structural mechanisms:

### **1. Behavioural Obsession & Displacement Chute:**

Standardized Codes of Conduct and mandatory training shift the regulatory focus entirely onto the individual conduct and interpersonal tone of elected representatives. This creates a functional displacement chute: when a community member flags a complex process or policy corruption issue, state machinery automatically treats it as a minor behavioural bickering unit, leaving the underlying executive overreach completely un-scrutinized.

### **2. Weaponisation of Psychosocial Frameworks:**

By establishing complex state-backed mechanisms to penalize councillors for public criticisms of administrative decisions, the reforms reward passivity. If a councillor performs rigorous due diligence and aggressively challenges a deficient executive report, the architecture makes it easy for the CEO to frame that scrutiny as a behavioural breach or a workplace psychosocial hazard.

### **3. Preserved Information Monopoly:**

The reforms conspicuously fail to provide Councils with independent, un-filtered research units, direct access to staff, or real-time advisory support from state oversight bodies. The CEO remains the sole legal gatekeeper of all data flowing from the bureaucracy to the chamber floor, ensuring that the executive monopoly remains structurally intact and legally reinforced.

## **Part IV: Core Structural Conclusions**

### **4. Executive Protection Over Community Democracy:**

The statutory framework treats local governments as legislated bodies corporate but exempts them from standard corporate laws (such as independent director audit tracking). This protection allows an unelected administration to override elected councillors, consolidate control over information, and shield its liabilities behind ratepayer-funded legal and public relations budgets.

### **5. Automated Self-Investigation Loop:**

Under the current devolved architecture, state-level integrity agencies (PSC, CCC, DLGSC) function as procedural clearinghouses rather than active field umpires. When data-backed alerts regarding executive overreach are lodged, the system utilizes automated referral loops to chute the file directly back into the hands of the targeted CEO, allowing the administration to write its own clean bill of health.

### **6. Laundering of Process Corruption:**

A profound regulatory void exists between individual behavioural integrity and surface-level procedural correctness. A sophisticated executive class can systematically corrupt a process—by delaying FOI access, curated reporting, delaying contaminated site remediation, or refusing to enforce building codes—completely within its broad administrative discretion. Because these manoeuvres are "legal" on paper, the CCC

dismisses them as sub-criminal, the SAT cleanses them via technical merits review, and the Ombudsman validates them via procedural tick-boxes.

#### **7. Bi-Directional Projection of Psychosocial Risk:**

The oversight network is completely blind to how the executive's defensive corporate fortress projects severe psychological trauma, cognitive exhaustion, and financial pressure backward onto the civic watchdogs and reformist councillors themselves. The safety apparatus is co-opted so completely that the unelected executive class enjoys a stress-free working environment, while the democratic oversight actors face chronic, state-sanctioned hostility.

#### **8. Apex Matrix Capture:**

With the state outsourcing mandatory councillor education to a private advocacy union (WALGA), and staffing the supreme new Inspectorate with veteran sector insiders, the accountability mechanism itself has been captured. The oversight network functions as a series of disconnected, passive check-points that actively insulates the unelected executive monopoly from genuine democratic control.

## **Chapter 1**

### **Department of Local Government, Sport and Cultural Industries (DLGSC) & The Local Government Inspector**

#### **9. Statutory Mandate and Intent**

Under the *Local Government Act 1995* (WA), the Department of Local Government, Sport and Cultural Industries (DLGSC) is established as the principal regulatory custodian of the municipal sector. Its foundational legislative purpose is to administer the Act, guide sector performance, ensure compliance, and exercise the state's interventionist powers when local governance fails.

The Local Government Inspector and the accompanying departmental compliance infrastructure act as the primary enforcement arm. Statutorily, this apparatus holds the mandate to receive community complaints, initiate serious inquiries, authorise authorized person investigations under Part 8 of the Act, and advise the Minister on whether a council should be suspended or dismissed in the public interest.

This structural intent is further defined by Section 1.3(2) of the Act, which explicitly states that the legislation is intended to result in better decision-making, greater community participation in the decisions and affairs of local governments, greater accountability of local governments to their communities, and more efficient and effective local government. The legislative architecture was designed to feature a centralized, proactive state authority monitoring local councils to protect local democracy and ensure administrative integrity.

#### **10. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness**

The operational reality of the DLGSC reveals a profound divergence from its statutory intent. The architecture is compromised by institutional passivity, an asymmetric

regulatory focus, and a toxic combination of rigid legislative design flaws and entrenched bureaucratic behaviour.

### **11. Passive Enforcement and Volume-Based Metrics**

The DLGSC does not operate as an active field regulator. It possesses no meaningful proactive inspectorate capable of dropping into municipal offices to audit administrative integrity unannounced. Instead, it relies almost entirely on retrospective, self-reported compliance checklists.

The department measures its application of its legislative purpose through purely volume and procedural-based metrics rather than assessing the integrity, health, or competence of local government administrations. Its self-assessment metrics track the volume of administrative activity, specifically focusing on the percentage of local governments that had formal compliance actions taken against their elected members or employees within a financial year, and the average time taken to complete basic compliance reviews or process standard statutory complaints.

This volume-based framework creates an upside-down regulatory incentive. If the DLGSC takes fewer actions against local governments over time, it records this as a maintained or improved performance target, claiming it demonstrates increased sector capability. In reality, a declining rate of regulatory interventions under a volume-based metric system is a primary indicator of structural capture. Fewer interventions merely reflect the department's institutional passivity or its inability to penetrate corporate shielding. The DLGSC measures bureaucratic output rather than democratic outcomes. It treats a dismissed systemic complaint as a successful processed unit, rendering its metrics blind to structural bias.

### **12. "Revolving Door" Effect and Bureaucratic Proximity**

A fluid personnel pipeline exists between municipal executive management, peak sector advocacy bodies, and the DLGSC compliance division. Officers routinely cycle between writing local government policies and regulating them from the state level. This proximity dilutes regulatory detachment and drives an in-group bias that depresses intervention rates. Because personnel share an institutional identity, a departmental bureaucrat assessing a community complaint instinctively views the scenario through the exact same corporate risk-management lens as the local CEO being complained about, identifying with the administrative executive rather than the civic complainant.

This revolving door transforms enforcement into informal negotiation. When serious administrative deficiencies are detected, instead of issuing statutory intervention orders or launching Part 8 authorized inquiries, the DLGSC's default position is to issue informal letters of concern. The regulator encourages the local authority to engage with its official partners to establish an internal checklist, which is then managed via an un-policed, self-monitored improvement plan.

The state regulator relies on these institutional partners to co-design legislative updates and regulatory processes. Because these peak bodies exist to protect the interests of municipal administrators, "fewer actions" becomes a shared political KPI that both the DLGSC and local executives present to the Minister to falsely claim the sector is operating smoothly, concealing systemic structural failures behind a facade of statistical harmony.

### **13. Legislative and Behavioural Filter**

The structural exclusion of independent community groups creates an irreconcilable statutory paradox when measured against the community participation and accountability

mandates of Section 1.3(2). The "hardwiring" that causes this failure is both legislative and behavioural.

Legislatively, the Act creates a tiered legitimacy framework. While Section 1.3(2) expresses an aspirational intention for community participation, the mechanical, operative parts of the Act do not codify any functional pathways for community-led oversight. Furthermore, by establishing each local government as a "body corporate" under Section 2.5, the Act legally treats a municipality as a commercial entity rather than a pure civic democracy. This statutory construction empowers the executive to apply standard corporate protections—such as commercial confidentiality, internal reporting chains, and corporate legal shields—which naturally crowd out the participation criteria of Section 1.3(2).

Behaviourally, because the operative text of the Act forces the DLGSC to act as a process auditor rather than a democratic umpire, the department has developed a risk-averse, highly defensive institutional culture. Incorporating community oversight data is viewed as dynamic, unpredictable, and politically volatile. From an efficiency standpoint, it is easier for a DLGSC compliance officer to accept a pre-packaged corporate assurance from a City CEO. Culturally, the DLGSC views public administration as an exclusive ecosystem for credentialed professionals. Independent citizen oversight is behaviourally coded as external interference or amateur activism, and the department protects its administrative monopoly by ignoring outside data.

#### **14. Deconstruction of the Compliance Audit Return (CAR)**

The primary instrument utilized by the DLGSC to maintain this compliance framework is the annual Compliance Audit Return (CAR), a mandatory questionnaire issued under the *Local Government (Audit) Regulations 1996*.

#### **15. Architecture of the CAR Questions**

The questions used in the CAR are created strictly by the state authority, specifically the DLGSC and the newly formed Local Government Inspectorate. The Local Authority has zero role in drafting, modifying, or choosing these questions. The state authority holds absolute control over the questionnaire, translating legislative clauses into 90+ "Yes/No" check-box metrics distributed via an online portal. The Local Government Inspector holds exclusive discretionary power to limit or specify what statutory requirements are included in the return for any given year.

The core structural feature of CAR questions is that they are binary, procedural, retrospective, and framed strictly as "Yes," "No," or "N/A" check-boxes. They track whether specific procedural tasks were completed, such as keeping a register of delegations to the CEO or submitting financial reports by deadlines, but they remain entirely blind to how or why those tasks were completed. Because the state authority deliberately chooses to construct a form consisting entirely of administrative box-ticking, the superficiality of its metrics is entirely a state-engineered failure that ensures local authorities are never forced to answer questions regarding qualitative transparency, executive bias, or adherence to Section 1.3(2).

## **16. How the CAR Impedes Democratic Oversight**

The CAR acts as a significant impediment to genuine democratic oversight through three primary mechanisms:

### **17. Form Over Substance:**

The "tick-box" illusion measures procedural completion while ignoring structural impact. A council can check "Yes" to indicate that a register of delegations was reviewed, but the question cannot capture whether those delegations have stripped the elected councillors of their democratic right to review multi-million dollar property assets or controversial rezonings.

### **18. Process-Driven Shield for Executives:**

Because the CAR is a formal state document, local government executives use a flawless return as an unassailable shield against community criticism. If an administration faces scrutiny over lack of transparency, it can present its clean CAR to the Council and the media to claim absolute competence, shifting the definition of good governance away from transparent, democratic community engagement and reducing it to successful bureaucratic form-filling.

### **19. Crowding Out Qualitative Due Diligence:**

The process of compiling, verifying, and adopting the CAR consumes significant administrative time and focus for both internal staff and the council's Audit Committee. This exhaustive box-ticking exercise crowds out meaningful performance auditing. Committee members spend hours verifying whether minor procedural deadlines were met, rather than conducting qualitative, adversarial reviews of executive bias or reporting integrity.

### **20. Assumption of Quasi-Judicial Power**

An analysis of correspondence from the Inspectorate and the DLGSC reveals that Inspectors appear to have assumed an unauthorized quasi-judicial power. In Western Australian governance, the role of an Inspector under Part 8 of the Act is strictly investigative, fact-finding, and administrative. Inspectors are empowered to gather evidence, compel documents, and report findings to the Director General or the Minister. They do not possess judicial power; they are not judges, and their office is not a court of law. Publicly available administrative records and parliamentary debates contain no official acknowledgement or inference that they hold such powers.

However, within the opaque layers of departmental correspondence, Inspectors unilaterally evaluate complaints and issue definitive determinations on the legality or intent of a council's actions, behaviourally functioning as a summary court of dismissal. When an Inspector reviews a community complaint regarding systemic executive bias or misrepresentation and responds by declaring that the administration "acted within its powers" or that "no breach occurred," they are pre-judging the legal merits of the case.

This assumption of quasi-judicial power operates as an asymmetric shield. For the council executive, a legalistic dismissal letter from an Inspector is seized upon as an official, binding legal exoneration to present to the Council and media to close down internal debate. For the community and councillors, it cuts off any meaningful avenue of appeal by creating a psychological and procedural dead-end, deterring citizens or reformist councillors from pursuing further scrutiny. This practice successfully masks institutional passivity with pseudo-judicial authority; instead of performing an active, adversarial investigation into why an administration curated a report a certain way, the Inspector acts

as a passive judge reviewing a static folder, noting that the paperwork is technically in order, and issuing a "ruling" that no further action is warranted.

## **21. City of Melville as a Case Study**

When isolated to the City of Melville, the systemic weaknesses of the DLGSC, the flaws of the CAR, and the passivity of the Inspectorate manifest as a protective shield for the unelected executive monopoly.

## **22. Neutralisation of Community Governance Alerts**

The City of Melville's corporate tracking measures its relationship with the state regulator purely through the prism of technical, binary compliance. The executive measures interaction quality through the Compliance Audit Return score, meeting statutory deadlines for lodgement of files, and tracking progress against externally flagged letters of concern by checking off boxes on a Council-approved "Governance Improvement Plan." If the City of Melville lodges its financial files on time and returns a CAR filled with checked boxes, the executive claims absolute administrative competence, using basic administrative compliance to validate an insulated executive monopoly while completely bypassing any measure of genuine transparency or community service competence.

Historical records and community tracking show a long-standing pattern where complex, data-backed complaints submitted by Melville residents or reform-minded councillors were absorbed into a bureaucratic void. The DLGSC's standard operational procedure has been to issue generic, procedural responses rather than initiating forensic administrative investigations. By treating sophisticated complaints regarding reporting bias as mere local political noise, the department has historically validated the executive's stance that all internal processes are above reproach.

## **23. Asymmetric Enforcement Realities**

While structural administrative actions by the Melville executive have faced prolonged departmental inertia, the DLGSC's enforcement mechanisms have historically acted with notable swiftness when responding to complaints targeting individual councillor behaviour. This creates an environment where an executive can confidently utilize state regulatory machinery to suppress internal council opposition, secure in the knowledge that the department's passive architecture will rarely pivot to scrutinize the administration's own operational integrity.

## **24. Impact of Recent Reforms**

Recent amendments to the *Local Government Act*—advertised as measures to elevate sector accountability—have functionally worsened the DLGSC's systemic weaknesses.

## **25. Institutionalisation of the Behavioural Obsession**

The legislative introduction of the mandatory Code of Conduct framework and the centralized standardisation of councillor training have codified the DLGSC's fixation on individual behaviour over systemic administrative integrity. By providing a rigid, state-backed mechanism to penalize elected representatives for minor interpersonal or public criticisms of administrative advice, the reforms have been weaponised by sophisticated executives.

## **26. Chilling Effect on Scrutiny and Pros/Cons for Council**

Because the *Local Government Act 1995* separates the political entity (the elected Council) from the administrative entity (the executive), the effects of this low-intervention, reformed environment are highly asymmetric.

For the elected Council, the pros are limited to superficial protections: it insulates them from political branding risk by reducing negative media cycles associated with formal state interventions, and it reduces the immediate risk of the Minister suspending the entire Council to appoint a commissioner.

However, the cons for the Council are severe. It forces a total dependency on executive information, leaving elected councillors entirely dependent on the CEO for data, legal advice, and options, with no independent umpire to test whether reports are directionally biased. It results in the total loss of a democratic appeal mechanism; if a councillor believes the administration is acting in bad faith or concealing documents, the DLGSC's passivity leaves them politically exposed and legally liable for decisions made based on curated data.

Finally, it creates an institutional chilling effect. If a Melville councillor intensely interrogates a flawed or directionally biased executive report, the current reformed framework makes it remarkably easy for the CEO or compliant council majorities to frame that rigorous due diligence as a behavioural breach, a psychosocial hazard, or a frivolous complaint. The department's compliance officers then spend state resources policing the tone and conduct of the elected representative, leaving the structural validity of the underlying administrative action completely unexamined. The reform architecture rewards passivity in elected officials and punishes active democratic oversight.

## Summary Matrix — Chapter 1: DLGSC & The Inspectorate

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 1 investigation.

| Diagnostic Vector              | Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)                                                                             | Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)                                                                                                                                                          | Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)                                                                                                     | Impact of Recent Reforms                                                                                                                                |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Performance Measurement</b> | To assess and ensure the integrity, health, and democratic competence of local administrations.               | <b>Volume-Based Inversion</b><br>Metrics track <i>processed files</i> rather than <i>democratic outcomes</i> . Lower intervention rates are falsely logged as "increased sector capability." | Clean technical audits and on-time file lodgements are used by the executive as an unassailable shield to validate an insulated monopoly.         | <b>Fixation on Form</b><br>Reforms reinforce bureaucratic box-ticking, leaving the qualitative truth of administrative reporting completely unmeasured. |
| <b>Regulatory Enforcement</b>  | A proactive, independent state umpire that actively protects the democratic intent of <b>Section 1.3(2)</b> . | <b>Passive Retrospective Auditing</b><br>No active field-inspectorate exists. The department relies on self-reported                                                                         | Systemic, data-backed community complaints regarding report curation are absorbed into a bureaucratic void or dismissed as minor political noise. | <b>Behavioural Obsession</b><br>The state's enforcement machinery is tilted toward policing individual councillor conduct,                              |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>                    | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                          | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                                             | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                                                | <b>Impact of Recent Reforms</b>                                                                                                                                                           |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                             |                                                                                                                   | compliance returns prepared by the regulated executives themselves.                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                                                                     | leaving executive overreach completely un-scrutinized.                                                                                                                                    |
| <b>Compliance Audit Return (CAR)</b>        | To verify sector-wide compliance with statutory obligations and ensure administrative transparent boundaries.     | <b>State-Engineered Superficiality</b><br>The DLGSC deliberately structures the form as a binary, "Yes/No" procedural checklist completely blind to executive bias or over-delegation. | The Audit Committee spends significant administrative time verifying minor procedural deadlines rather than conducting qualitative, adversarial performance audits. | <b>No Structural Changes</b><br>The CAR continues to exclude qualitative exception reporting, mandatory independent text fields, or community consultation integrity checks.              |
| <b>Exercise of Inspectoral Power</b>        | An investigative, fact-finding, and administrative apparatus designed to gather evidence for the Minister.        | <b>Behavioural Quasi-Judicial Overreach</b><br>Inspectors issue definitive summary letters pre-judging legal merits, effectively acting as an unauthorized court of dismissal.         | Summary dismissal letters are instantly seized upon by the CEO as an official "legal exoneration," shutting down internal chamber debate and community appeals.     | <b>Chilling Effect</b><br>Frameworks make it easier for the executive to frame intense councillor scrutiny as a behavioural breach or a frivolous complaint to the Inspectorate.          |
| <b>Sector Engagement &amp; Consultation</b> | To foster greater community participation and accountability as explicitly mandated under <b>Section 1.3(2)</b> . | <b>Exclusive Cultural Filter</b><br>The "revolving door" class filters out independent citizen groups, treating them as "external amateurs" while relying solely on WALGA templates.   | Independent oversight groups (e.g., MRRA, Shadow Council) are blocked from formal regulatory integration by entrenched bureaucratic bias.                           | <b>Institutionalized Monopoly</b><br>Outsourcing mandatory training to WALGA allows a private advocacy union to control the narrative of what constitutes "appropriate council scrutiny." |

# Chapter 2

## Public Sector Commission (PSC) & The Devolved Local Government Architecture

### 27. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *Public Sector Management Act 1994* (WA) and the *Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003* (WA), the Public Sector Commission (PSC) is charged with promoting integrity, establishing codes of conduct, and monitoring ethical standards across the Western Australian public sector. Following structural legislative alignments, the PSC holds explicit responsibility for assessing, managing, and monitoring allegations of minor misconduct within public authorities, which statutorily includes local government entities.

The legislative intent behind the PSC's minor misconduct jurisdiction is to ensure that behavioural or administrative integrity failures that do not cross the high threshold of criminal corruption are independently audited, recorded, and corrected. By setting overarching Public Sector Standards and managing minor misconduct reports, the PSC is intended to serve as a centralized ethical backstop, ensuring that public officials—including unelected municipal administrators—are held to rigorous standards of honesty, transparency, and fairness.

However, when this ideal is tested against the actual mechanics of public administration, a profound gulf emerges between statutory intent and operational reality. The statement that the PSC serves as a centralized ethical backstop represents a high-level legislative rationale presented to the public that collapses under the weight of its own administrative architecture.

### 28. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness

When applied to the local government sector, the PSC's operational framework reveals a profound architectural flaw: it is completely devolved. Unlike its active oversight of core state government departments, the PSC operates on an outsourced accountability model when dealing with municipal corporations.

### 29. Self-Investigation Loophole

The core systemic weakness of the PSC model is its statutory practice of referring allegations of minor misconduct back to the principal officer of the targeted agency. In the unique ecosystem of a local government, the principal officer is the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

If a community member, an elected councillor, or an internal whistleblower submits a detailed report alleging that a municipal administration is systematically manipulating internal policies, misrepresenting facts to the council, or acting with systemic bias, the PSC's standard procedure is to notify the CEO and delegate the fact-finding or investigation back to that CEO's office. This creates an absurd conflict of interest where the executive structure being complained about is legally tasked with managing, investigating, and determining the validity of the complaint against itself. The administration controls the scope of the inquiry, chooses which documents to review, and ultimately reports back to the PSC that no misconduct occurred.

In practice, "managing" minor misconduct reports does not mean the PSC actively investigates them. Because the PSC operates with a highly centralized, desk-bound review

team, its management of local government complaints is almost entirely procedural rather than adversarial. When an integrity alert is lodged, the PSC acts as a clearinghouse rather than an investigator, instantly chuting the file back to the local council's CEO under the devolved architecture. This system of outsourced accountability relies on the very hierarchy being complained about to determine if an ethical failure occurred.

This horizontal 'passing of the parcel' between state-level watchdogs and the local executive represents the literal manifestation of the architectural flaws warned of by Chief Justice Wayne Martin AC in his landmark 2013 Whitmore Lecture. His honour conceptualised these fragmented statutory bodies as an uncoordinated 'Fourth Arm of Government' that operates in dangerous, reactive regulatory silos. Chief Justice Martin explicitly warned that without a horizontally integrated, unified mandate, these independent watchdogs inevitably allow complex integrity issues to fall into structural cracks, creating deep institutional dysfunction.

This systemic failure is heavily compounded by what public policy expert Dr Andrew Podger AO terms the 'Devolved Accountability Fallacy'. Podger's public sector governance analyses prove that when high-tier integrity watchdogs systematically chute minor misconduct complaints back to the principal executive officer of a targeted agency for self-investigation, the mechanism completely abdicates the prerequisite test of institutional distance. By allowing the target hierarchy to control the scope, select the files, and dictate the final findings, the state actively validates an un-auditable corporate fortress that is entirely insulated from external, adversarial accountability.

### **30. Statutory Power Asymmetry of the CEO**

This devolved model is particularly toxic in local government because of the absolute statutory employment monopoly held by the CEO under the Local Government Act 1995. In a state department, public servants operate under cross-departmental protections and a broader public service structure.

In a local government, every single member of the staff—including internal auditors, governance officers, and line workers—is a direct employee of the CEO. The CEO holds exclusive legal power to hire, fire, discipline, and promote. This concentration of power ensures that when the PSC devolves a minor misconduct matter back to a council, internal staff are structurally disincentivised from cooperating with any internal review in an adversarial manner. Whistleblowing or challenging the executive's narrative carries immediate career-ending risks, effectively sealing the administrative fortress from the inside.

### **31. Taxonomy of Local Government Codes and the Jurisdiction Void**

To understand where the Public Sector Commission sits, it is necessary to examine the fragmented regulatory landscape governing personnel at the municipal level. The local government sector features at least six distinct classes of persons, each bound by separate, often bifurcated statutory frameworks:

- **Council Members (Elected Councillors/Mayors):** Governed by the legislated Model Code of Conduct prescribed under the Local Government Regulations, focusing on meeting behaviour, resource use, and personal integrity.
- **Council Committee Members:** Bound by the same Model Code of Conduct framework, despite not being elected representatives.

- **Local Government Election Candidates:** Subject to specific behavioural rules within the Model Code of Conduct during an election campaign period to prevent reputational damage and ensure electoral integrity.
- **The Chief Executive Officer (CEO):** Governed by a separate, dedicated Model Code of Conduct for CEOs that handles recruitment, performance monitoring, and operational standards.
- **Local Government Employees (Staff):** Governed by an internal Employee Code of Conduct prepared, implemented, and modified at the absolute discretion of the CEO.
- **Authorised Persons / Contractors / Volunteers:** Bound either by specific commercial contract conditions, organizational volunteer policies, or separate statutory instruments depending on their delegated authority.

### 32. Statutory Exclusion

Under the *Public Sector Management Act 1994*, local government authorities are explicitly excluded from the definition of a "public sector body." Therefore, the PSC's own Code of Ethics and Commissioner's Instructions do not directly bind, sit over, or dictate daily operational rules to any of the six classes of local government persons. Because of this exclusion, local government administrations are left to operate in an ethics vacuum relative to core state public servants. The CEO determines the code for staff, and the regulations dictate the code for politicians. The PSC has no legislative power to write or enforce a unified code across these six municipal classes.

### 33. Devolved Crossover and Impact

While the PSC's Code of Ethics has no direct operational supremacy, the PSC exerts significant systemic influence via a completely separate legislative channel: the *Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003* (CCM Act). Under the CCM Act, all six classes of persons are legally defined as "public officers." This definition creates a complex crossover mechanism where the PSC inherits jurisdiction only when a person within one of the six classes breaches their own specific local code or statutory duty in a manner that constitutes minor misconduct.

This architectural arrangement creates a severe systemic weakness. The PSC relies on local authorities to maintain their own separate, siloed codes of conduct. When a minor misconduct alert is triggered, the PSC does not apply a standardized state public sector code of conduct to investigate. Instead, it looks down at the local council's fractured internal frameworks. Because there is no direct crossover of the PSC's high-level public sector code, local executive monopolies can exploit gaps between the six different classes. For instance, a CEO can alter internal staff codes to shield administrative actions from councillor scrutiny, while the PSC remains blind to the manoeuvre because it only monitors whether a technical breach of the existing local framework occurred, rather than auditing the ethical integrity of the system as a whole.

### 34. Distortion of the Minor Misconduct Definition

The operational efficacy of the PSC is heavily degraded by its behavioural reliance on an artificially narrowed definition of minor misconduct. In practice, the PSC routinely advises complainants that it relies on an interpretation requiring the minor misconduct to be both wilful and to result in a personal, direct benefit to the offender. This reliance represents a severe structural distortion of the statutory reality.

Under Section 4(d) of the *Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003*, minor misconduct does not require the behaviour to be both wilful and result in a personal benefit to the

offender. Statutorily, minor misconduct involves actions by a public officer that impair honest and impartial performance, breach public trust, or misuse information regardless of personal gain or detriment to others.

By demanding evidence of personal benefit or framing misconduct strictly as a wilful pursuit of self-interest, the PSC structurally shields local government executives from accountability. This narrow interpretation dismisses sophisticated, systemic administrative manipulation—such as the deliberate suppression of critical community risk assessments or the strategic framing of land-use choices—as mere administrative error or poor judgment rather than minor misconduct.

Furthermore, a profound regulatory void exists regarding substandard conduct that corrupts local government activities but falls short of formal minor misconduct thresholds. The PSC restricts its minor misconduct assessments to serious behaviour that could lead to termination. This focus on terminable offenses leaves a vast grey zone of sub-threshold issues entirely un-scrutinized. Advisory codes of ethics fail to police municipal manipulation, ensuring that the spirit of democratic oversight is sacrificed at the altar of basic technical compliance.

### **35. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Devolved Blind Spot**

The systemic weakness of the PSC is further compounded by its fragmented relationship with other oversight agencies. Rather than forming a cohesive integrity web, the interfaces between the PSC and other regulators create an administrative passing of the parcel that isolates local governments from genuine accountability.

### **36. PSC-CCC Boundary Split**

The *Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003* bifurcates public sector integrity into "serious misconduct" (managed by the Crime and Corruption Commission) and "minor misconduct" (managed by the PSC). When a complex governance complaint is submitted to the CCC involving administrative manipulation or report-curation, the CCC evaluates it against its high criminal/indictable threshold. Finding no overt evidence of criminal corruption, the CCC dismisses the serious element and automatically forwards the file down to the PSC as a minor misconduct matter.

Upon receiving the file from the CCC, the PSC applies its devolved architecture. Because it lacks the field investigators to unpack municipal disputes, the PSC instantly chutes the complaint back down to the local government CEO. Thus, a serious, data-backed integrity alert that started at the state's supreme anti-corruption body is systematically downgraded, passed along, and delivered directly into the hands of the executive target, who then writes the final dismissal report.

### **37. PSC-DLGSC Disconnect**

While the PSC sets integrity guidelines, the Department of Local Government, Sport and Cultural Industries (DLGSC) administers the *Local Government Act 1995*. This functional split allows both agencies to evade systemic responsibility. When a complaint highlights that a local administration is weaponizing codes of conduct to restrict democratic oversight, the DLGSC states that integrity breaches and minor misconduct fall under the mandate of the PSC. Concurrently, the PSC asserts that because local governments are governed by their own distinct body corporate statute, specific operational behaviour and administrative processes are the responsibility of the DLGSC or the Local Government Inspector.

This horizontal buck-passing ensures that systemic administrative manoeuvres, such as the calculated filtering of community consultation data before it reaches elected councillors, fall directly into a regulatory void between the two agencies, completely un-scrutinized.

### **38. PSC and WorkSafe WA: The Inversion Loophole**

The interface between the PSC and WorkSafe WA creates a profound systemic vulnerability regarding internal whistleblowers and reformist councillors. Both agencies handle elements of workplace conduct: the PSC monitors minor misconduct (such as a senior manager bullying a subordinate to alter an internal report), while WorkSafe polices psychosocial hazards (such as a toxic work environment causing psychological injury).

Because the PSC routinely devolves minor misconduct allegations back to the local government CEO for internal investigation, the identity of a complainant or whistleblower is frequently exposed to the executive hierarchy. Once exposed, a sophisticated administration can weaponize WorkSafe's psychosocial safety codes against that individual. If an internal staff member or councillor aggressively pursues an integrity issue, the CEO can claim that this intense scrutiny constitutes workplace bullying or creates a psychosocial hazard to administrative staff. The executive reports this to WorkSafe to secure communication bans or lockout orders, while the PSC remains completely blind to

how its own devolved referral directly triggered the punitive use of workplace safety frameworks.

### **39. PSC and the WA Ombudsman: The Fragmented Shield**

The interface between the PSC and the Office of the Western Australian Ombudsman introduces another critical systemic fracture point within the local government oversight network. While the PSC is statutorily focused on the integrity and behavioural conduct of individuals, the Ombudsman holds an independent parliamentary mandate to investigate the fairness and lawfulness of administrative decisions and procedures made by public authorities, including local councils. The separation of these two distinct remits creates an uncoordinated, fragmented environment that actively insulates local executives from holistic scrutiny.

The relationship between the PSC and the Ombudsman is governed by a strict, binary boundary that separates administrative procedure from employee conduct. If a local government issues a highly contentious administrative order, selectively applies a localized policy, or delays service, the affected ratepayer can appeal to the Ombudsman, who reviews whether the council's decision was unlawful, unreasonable, unjust, or improperly discriminatory. If that exact same administrative decision was engineered by an internal director or CEO who deliberately falsified internal briefings or acted with personal, undeclared bias, that behavioural element shifts to the PSC's minor misconduct jurisdiction.

Because the two agencies are completely siloed and possess no structural mechanism to combine their data or conduct joint operations, a sophisticated council executive can successfully defeat both investigations simultaneously. When the Ombudsman launches a review into a local government decision, it approaches the matter through the lens of procedural correctness. If the paperwork provided by the CEO appears technically complete and follows the statutory steps on paper, the Ombudsman concludes there was no administrative error, remaining entirely blind to the hidden cultural corruption or executive pressure that dictated the creation of those documents in the first place.

If a community group concurrently flags the underlying executive bias to the PSC, the PSC applies its standard devolved architecture, referring the minor misconduct file right back to the CEO for self-investigation. If the Ombudsman has already looked at the surface-level decision and found it procedurally sound, the local executive can weaponize that finding. The CEO simply points to the Ombudsman's clean procedural bill of health to convince the PSC that the administrative process was flawless, forcing the PSC to close its file.

This horizontal divide means that when a local government executive intentionally manipulates administrative processes to insulate itself from public scrutiny, the complaint is sliced into separate pieces. The Ombudsman looks only at the passive administrative output, while the PSC delegates the behavioural input back to the perpetrator. The two halves of the problem are never connected, leaving the unelected executive monopoly completely untouched in the space between individual integrity and corporate form.

### **40. City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, the PSC's devolved self-investigation loop and fragmented inter-agency relationships function as a highly effective corporate shield.

### **41. Absorption and Refer-Back Loop**

Historical patterns indicate that when Melville residents or independent oversight advocates file alerts regarding administrative overreach, report framing, or the tactical

withholding of documents from councillors, these complaints enter the classic state-to-local referral loop. Because the allegations do not feature indictable, criminal bribes or theft, they are categorized as minor misconduct or procedural deviations.

The PSC's structural response has been to rely on the City's executive to manage the file. The Melville executive is empowered to deploy its internal governance teams or hire ratepayer-funded external consultants to produce a compliance report. This report invariably concludes that the administration acted within its administrative discretion. The PSC accepts this packaged assurance at face value, effectively allowing the Melville executive to write its own clean bill of health while leaving the community's core integrity concerns unaddressed.

#### **42. Weaponisation of Internal Conduct Policies**

The Melville context demonstrates how the PSC's hands-off approach allows a local administration to invert internal integrity frameworks. Because the PSC does not actively police the local application of minor misconduct rules, the executive can establish and deploy highly restrictive internal frameworks, such as "Unreasonable Complainant" or "Manageable Correspondence" policies.

When a persistent community advocate or a reformist councillor uncovers an administrative anomaly and repeatedly demands transparency, the executive can unilaterally declare that individual's behaviour to be vexatious, disruptive, or a risk to staff safety. The PSC routinely defers to these internal municipal policies. Consequently, the state's minor misconduct framework is effectively twisted: it stops being a tool to investigate executive overreach and becomes a mechanism that validates the executive's right to silence and lock out its democratic critics.

### **Summary Matrix — Chapter 2: Public Sector Commission (PSC)**

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 2 investigation.

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>                | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                                 | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                                         | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                                  | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                                                             |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Accountability &amp; Enforcement</b> | To act as a centralized, independent ethical backstop ensuring honesty, transparency, and fairness across public bodies. | <b>Self-Investigation Loophole</b><br>The PSC possesses no proactive field investigators for local councils, operating instead on an entirely devolved model.                      | Systemic complaints regarding administrative manipulation are referred back to the City's executive, allowing the target to investigate itself.       | <b>CCC-PSC Referral Chute</b><br>The CCC downgrades complex reports below its serious threshold and chutes them to the PSC, which instantly drops them into the CEO's hands.                                  |
| <b>Workforce Dynamics</b>               | To protect internal whistleblowers and encourage cross-departmental standards of integrity.                              | <b>Employment Monopoly Vulnerability</b><br>Because the CEO holds near-absolute statutory control over hiring, firing, and discipline, internal staff cannot safely voice dissent. | Internal staff and governance teams are structurally disincentivised from cooperating with investigations in an adversarial or transparent manner.    | <b>WorkSafe Inversion</b><br>Exposing a whistleblower's identity via a devolved PSC referral allows an administration to weaponize WorkSafe codes to label critics as "psychosocial hazards."                 |
| <b>Integrity Standards &amp; Codes</b>  | To enforce a unified, high-level public sector Code of Ethics across all administrative classes.                         | <b>Statutory Exclusion Void</b><br>The <i>Public Sector Management Act 1994</i> explicitly excludes local governments from the definition of a public sector body.                 | The PSC does not enforce a unified ethical code across the sector's six distinct classes of persons, looking only at fractured, localized frameworks. | <b>The DLGSC Passing of the Parcel</b><br>The PSC claims municipal administrative conduct is a DLGSC matter, while the DLGSC claims ethical misconduct is a PSC matter, leaving a systemic regulatory vacuum. |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>                   | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                       | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                              | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                                                        | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                                                          |
|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Operational Thresholds</b>              | To monitor and correct minor misconduct and sub-threshold behaviour before it corrupts administrative systems. | <b>Artificially Narrow Filter</b><br>Behavioural reliance on a distorted definition requiring misconduct to be both wilful and to result in a personal, direct benefit. | Sophisticated administrative manoeuvring—such as directionally filtering reports to guide council votes—is dismissed as simple administrative error.                        | <b>Ombudsman Boundary Split</b><br>The Ombudsman reviews surface-level procedural correctness while the PSC handles behavioural input, ensuring the two halves of a problem are never connected.           |
| <b>Community Scrutiny &amp; Engagement</b> | To uphold the principles of transparency and public trust by acting on community-driven alerts.                | <b>Bureaucratic Defence Shield</b><br>The PSC maintains a hands-off, procedural clearinghouse approach that accepts pre-packaged corporate assurances from CEOs.        | The City utilizes ratepayer-funded legal counsel and restrictive internal policies to lock out community advocates, which the PSC treats as a valid exercise of discretion. | <b>Ombudsman Validation Loop</b><br>If the Ombudsman finds a council decision procedurally correct on paper, the CEO uses that finding to convince the PSC to permanently close its minor misconduct file. |

## Chapter 3

### Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) & The Freedom of Information (FOI) Framework

#### 43. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *Freedom of Information Act 1992* (WA) (the FOI Act), the **Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC)** is established as an independent, quasi-judicial authority reporting directly to Parliament. The foundational statutory intent of the FOI framework is to create a transparent public service by giving the public a legal right to access documents held by Western Australian government agencies, ministers, and local governments.

The legislative philosophy underpinning the Act is explicitly stated in its preamble: to facilitate public participation in democracy, ensure government transparency, and hold public institutions accountable to the community. The OIC is tasked with reviewing disputes, handling external appeals when an agency refuses access to information, and ensuring that statutory exemptions are applied strictly and neutrally. The statutory design

intends for information to flow freely, treating open disclosure as the default state and secrecy as the tightly restricted exception.

#### **44. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness**

When isolated to the local government sector, the operational mechanics of the FOI framework reveal a profound structural failure. Rather than acting as a gateway for transparency, the framework is routinely inverted by sophisticated municipal administrations into an instrument of information starvation and tactical litigation delay. This systemic failure is driven by an intense asymmetry of resources and time.

#### **45. Local Gatekeeper Monopoly**

Unlike state government departments that employ centralized, career-detached FOI officers, local government FOI requests are processed internally by governance teams answering directly to the Chief Executive Officer. This creates a critical structural conflict of interest. The exact individual whose executive decisions, internal emails, or procurement reports are being scrutinized by community advocates holds absolute frontline control over which documents are released, redacted, or withheld.

The resulting informational asymmetry between the unelected executive and the community mirrors the core governance breakdowns identified by Crown Counsel John Thomson in the landmark Report of the Inquiry into the City of Perth (2020). Thomson articulated the 'Erosion of Boundaries' doctrine, demonstrating that when an unelected administration successfully establishes a total monopoly over raw data, background briefing papers, and corporate files, it completely de-authorises the democratic oversight function of the elected council.

When applied to the local government sector, the slow, multi-year FOI review track ceases to be a tool of transparency and becomes an instrument of tactical information starvation. As Thomson's findings warned, by forcing elected directors and community watchdogs to navigate the same highly adversarial pipeline to extract basic engineering briefs or financial models, the executive effectively isolates its operational maneuvers from due diligence until choices are completely irreversible.

#### **46. Weaponisation of Statutory Exemptions**

Local government executives routinely exploit the broad, subjective wording of exemptions contained within Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. Sophisticated administrations apply a hyper-aggressive, defensive interpretation to sensitive public interest files, routinely categorizing them under Clause 4 (Commercial-in-Confidence) to shield multi-million dollar public asset divestments or developer negotiations from community scrutiny; Clause 6 (Legal Professional Privilege) to classify internal administrative discussions as protected legal strategy; and Clause 7 (Personal Information) to execute blanket redactions on the names of executive officers or consultants, thereby obscuring institutional accountability.

#### **47. Asymmetry of Time (The Exhaustion Engine)**

The definitive systemic failure of the OIC oversight layer is its acute vulnerability to tactical delays. Because the OIC is chronically backlogged and operates on a reactive, desk-bound review model, external appeals regarding disputed documents frequently take up to two years to achieve a formal ruling.

Sophisticated executives treat this time lag as a powerful administrative weapon. They deliberately issue blanket access refusals, fully aware that by the time the backlogged OIC reviews the file and orders the documents released, the political and democratic utility of

the information is completely dead. The council has already voted, the commercial contracts are signed, the funds are spent, and the contentious project is a permanent reality. The delay mechanics successfully break the psychological and financial stamina of the community watchdogs.

#### **48. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Transparency Void**

The OIC operates in complete isolation from the state's primary integrity and regulatory bodies, creating a disconnected network that local executives easily exploit.

#### **49. OIC-DLGSC Disconnect**

The Department of Local Government, Sport and Cultural Industries (DLGSC) and the Local Government Inspectorate refuse to intervene in transparency disputes, stating that all matters relating to document access fall exclusively under the statutory jurisdiction of the OIC. Concurrently, the OIC maintains that its mandate is strictly limited to reviewing the technical application of the FOI Act to specific documents; it possesses zero statutory authority to audit the broader governance health or cultural secrecy of a council. This horizontal wall ensures that when an executive administration systematically weaponizes FOI delays to withhold reports from elected councillors themselves, the broader integrity failure falls into an un-policed regulatory void between the two agencies.

#### **50. Shield Against Anti-Corruption Scrutiny**

Because the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) and the Public Sector Commission (PSC) ignore process corruption, the tactical deployment of FOI delays is treated as a lawful exercise of administrative discretion. A local government CEO can spend tens of thousands of dollars in ratepayer-funded legal resources fighting a community advocate at an OIC hearing to prevent the release of a damning internal document. Because this litigation is technically permitted under the agency's corporate status, it never triggers a minor or serious misconduct investigation. The state's integrity frameworks remain blind to the reality that public funds are being deployed to systematically starve the public of their statutory right to open information.

#### **51. City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, the structural weaknesses of the FOI Act and the OIC backlog manifest as a powerful corporate fortress that effectively insulates the executive from community interrogation.

#### **52. Multi-Year FOI Battleground**

The City of Melville's historical interaction with the FOI process is defined by protracted, highly adversarial legal contests over critical governance files, internal correspondence, and unredacted business cases. Shadow Council tracking documents numerous instances where community advocates seeking ground-truth data on major commercial developments, asset sales, or environmental mitigations were met with systematic, blanket exemptions from the City's executive gatekeepers.

The City has routinely utilized ratepayer-funded legal budgets to defend these aggressive redactions before the Information Commissioner. By dragging these disputes out through the OIC's extensive review pipeline, the Melville executive successfully neutralized public scrutiny during critical decision-making windows, ensuring that highly controversial projects proceeded to final execution long before the underlying documentation was legally forced into the public domain.

#### **53. Defeating Councillor Due Diligence**

The Melville case study demonstrates that information starvation is not applied exclusively to external ratepayer groups; it is deployed inward against reform-minded or due-diligence councillors attempting to execute their oversight duties under Section 2.7 of the Act. When a councillor requests raw, uncurated financial models or independent engineering briefings, the executive class routinely restricts access by claiming the documents are operationally sensitive or subject to executive privilege. The councillor is forced to navigate the same slow, adversarial FOI pipeline as an ordinary citizen, exposing a profound architectural failure: the elected directors of a multi-million dollar municipal corporation are legally starved of the information required to govern the very entity they are legally liable for.

## Summary Matrix —Office of the Information Commissioner (OIC) / FOI

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 3 investigation.

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>    | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                                                   | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                             | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                        | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                               |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Statutory Mandate</b>    | To facilitate public participation in democracy and hold public institutions accountable by treating open disclosure as the default state. | <b>Transparency Inversion</b><br>The FOI framework is systematically inverted into a defensive instrument used to withhold documents and protect the administration.   | Multi-year legal battles over unredacted business cases and internal emails are used to prevent public interrogation of council operations. | <b>OIC-DLGSC Disconnect</b><br>The DLGSC treats document access strictly as an OIC issue, refusing to audit structural secrecy or data suppression.             |
| <b>Frontline Processing</b> | Independent, objective assessment of information requests to ensure neutral application of statutory rules.                                | <b>Local Gatekeeper Monopoly</b><br>FOI requests are managed internally by governance teams answering directly to the CEO, creating an inherent conflict of interest.  | The executive class retains frontline control over the redaction and release of files that directly scrutinize their own decisions.         | <b>PSC Blindness</b><br>The PSC ignores the intentional curation or suppression of internal files, viewing it as a permitted administrative right.              |
| <b>Use of Exemptions</b>    | Tightly restricted, strictly justified exceptions to open disclosure, applied only when a proven public interest detriment exists.         | <b>Hyper-Aggressive Shielding</b><br>Broad statutory definitions (e.g., Commercial confidence, Legal privilege) are weaponised as blanket shields for sensitive files. | The City applies aggressive exemptions to major land-use and asset-divestment profiles to bypass local community consultation.              | <b>Regulatory Void</b><br>The OIC evaluates only technical text exemptions, leaving the broader ethical subversion of process un-policed by any integrity body. |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>   | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                                       | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                             | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                   | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                          |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Oversight Timelines</b> | Timely resolution of information disputes to ensure transparency remains useful for democratic participation.                  | <b>Asymmetry of Time</b><br>Severe backlogs create a two-year delay engine that destroys the democratic utility of information before it is released.                  | Blanket refusals delay document release until long after contracts are signed, council has voted, and projects are fully executed.     | <b>Exhaustion Engine</b><br>The state's slow review pipeline works collaboratively with local executive budgets to break the financial stamina of citizen watchdogs.       |
| <b>Internal Governance</b> | To ensure elected directors have full, open access to corporate data to perform statutory oversight under <b>Section 2.7</b> . | <b>Inward Information Starvation</b><br>The executive applies the same slow, adversarial FOI pipeline to elected councillors, blocking access to raw financial models. | Reform-minded councillors are blocked from accessing independent engineering reports, disabling their legal capacity to govern safely. | <b>Structural Fortress</b><br>By forcing councillors into external appeal tracks, the executive successfully isolates the chamber floor from the administrative machinery. |

## Chapter 4

### Crime & Corruption Commission (CCC) & "Sub-Criminal" Regulatory Void

#### 54. 1. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003* (WA) (the CCM Act), the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) is established as Western Australia's supreme anti-corruption and integrity institution. Its foundational statutory purpose is to improve the integrity of, and reduce the incidence of misconduct in, the public sector.

To achieve this, the CCC is granted extraordinary, coercive law-enforcement powers. These include the authority to conduct telecommunication intercepts, carry out integrity testing, hold private or public examinations, compel the production of records, and issue search warrants.

The legislative intent behind the CCC's jurisdiction is clear: it acts as the state's ultimate shield against systemic institutional corruption. It is designed to expose criminal behaviour, bribery, extortion, and high-level official corruption that standard administrative departments lack the forensic teeth to uncover. Under the CCM Act, the local government sector explicitly falls within the CCC's jurisdiction, defining elected councillors, mayors, and unelected municipal executives as public officers.

## **55. 2. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness**

Despite its immense statutory powers, the CCC contains an architectural design feature that transforms it into a silent spectator when confronting the most damaging forms of local government administrative overreach: the serious misconduct threshold.

### **56. High Statutory Threshold**

The CCC is legally bound by a rigid, high evidentiary gateway. Under Section 3 of the CCM Act, the CCC can only investigate allegations that meet the strict definition of serious misconduct. This requires an allegation to involve:

- An official corruptly acting, or corruptly failing to act, in the performance of their functions; or
- An official committing an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term of two years or more.

While this threshold is highly effective for filtering out low-level administrative errors to catch criminal syndicates, it creates a massive statutory blind spot when applied to the localized arena of municipal administration.

### **57. "Sub-Criminal" Regulatory Void**

Sophisticated local government executives rarely engage in overt, indictable criminal acts like bribery or embezzlement. Instead, the consolidation of administrative power manifests through lawful but highly biased administrative manoeuvres. Because these actions are technically executed within the CEO's broad administrative discretion under the *Local Government Act 1995*, they do not constitute criminal behaviour or corrupt acts carrying a two-year prison sentence. They slip completely beneath the CCC's serious misconduct gateway, creating a vast, legally sanctioned sub-criminal regulatory void. An executive monopoly can systematically manipulate the data flowing to the democratic decision-makers while remaining entirely immune to anti-corruption oversight.

### **58. Spectrum of Misconduct and Corruption**

To achieve complete analytical precision, we must map out the exact taxonomy of how public office can be subverted, isolating how Western Australian legislation separates breaches of public office into distinct legal and conceptual silos. By understanding the walls between a code of conduct breach, statutory corruption, criminal corruption, and the corruption of process, procedure, policy, or law, we expose how local government executives legally insulate themselves.

### **59. Misconduct as a Failure of Local Codes**

At the base of the integrity pyramid sits the failure to adhere to a code of conduct. Local government personnel are fractured across multiple distinct codes, such as the legislated Model Code for Councillors, the Model Code for CEOs, and the internal Employee Code dictated by the CEO.

A code breach occurs when an individual fails to meet mandated standards regarding disclosure of interests, use of local government resources, or professional relationships. Under the CCM Act, a failure to adhere to these local codes constitutes the baseline definition of Minor Statutory Misconduct.

Because the state devolves the policing of these codes back to the local authority, a code breach is treated as a minor behavioural issue completely decoupled from any systemic analysis. If an executive officer breaks a code requirement to push a project forward, the

system treats it as an isolated personal infraction rather than an organized effort to subvert council oversight.

#### **60. Separation: Statutory Corruption vs. Criminal Corruption**

The legal framework draws a sharp, problematic line between corruption as an administrative state and criminal corruption as an indictable offense.

- **Criminal Corruption (The Criminal Code Axis):** This is strictly defined by the *Criminal Code Act 1913* (WA) (Sections 82 and 83). It requires an absolute, indictable standard of criminal proof and involves overt, indictable offenses. It occurs when a public officer corruptly asks for, receives, or obtains a property or pecuniary benefit for themselves or another person to act or omit to act in their official capacity. The focus here is entirely transactional, tracking a direct financial kickback, a bribe, or tangible fraud.
- **Statutory Corruption (The CCC Axis):** Under the CCM Act, statutory corruption is broader but heavily constrained. It occurs when a public officer corruptly acts or corruptly fails to act to secure an improper benefit or cause a detriment. However, because the CCC and the courts interpret corruptly as requiring a dishonest intent to achieve an outcome that crosses into serious illegality, it remains fixed on tracking blatant, bad-faith malice or criminal intent.

#### **61. Corruption of Process, Procedure, Policy, or Law**

This is the critical conceptual layer that the entire Western Australian oversight system is structurally blind to. Corruption of process, procedure, policy, or law occurs when a sophisticated administrative apparatus systematically subverts the intent of legislation, policies, and democratic safeguards while meticulously maintaining the appearance of technical, legal compliance. Unlike criminal corruption, this does not involve briefcases of cash or forged signatures. Instead, it involves the calculated manipulation of the machinery of governance:

- **Process Corruption:** Systematically delaying Freedom of Information requests, dragging out statutory review periods, or burying controversial engineering reports until a council vote has passed and a contract is signed. The process is technically followed, but its democratic utility is intentionally destroyed.
- **Procedural Corruption:** Utilizing ratepayer-funded legal counsel to apply aggressive statutory exemptions or using internal Unreasonable Complainant policies to block community advocates from accessing public data. The procedure is weaponized as a defensive fortress to insulate the executive from public scrutiny.
- **Policy Corruption:** The deliberate curation, filtering, or directional framing of executive briefings and reports provided to elected councillors. By selectively omitting independent counter-arguments or negative community consultation metrics, the administration shapes a one-sided narrative that legally steers council voting behaviour toward a pre-determined executive outcome.
- **Corruption of Law:** Exploiting broad statutory delegations under the *Local Government Act 1995* to strip elected councillors of their governing oversight over major public assets, effectively running a multi-million dollar municipality as a closed corporate entity rather than a public democracy.

The ultimate failure of the WA oversight network is that the CCC is statutorily hardwired to look only for Criminal and Statutory Corruption, while the most damaging form of

municipal overreach is the Corruption of Process, Procedure, Policy, and Law. Because an executive administration can corrupt a process entirely within its broad, lawful administrative discretion, the behaviour does not constitute a criminal offense or serious misconduct. The CCC dismisses it as a sub-criminal administrative matter, allowing an executive monopoly to safely subvert the spirit of the law while holding a clean technical compliance return.

Because the CCC evaluates files purely through a strict transactional axis—searching exclusively for criminal bribery or indictable fraud—it remains entirely blind to the strategic manipulation of governance machinery. This structural failure aligns perfectly with John Thomson’s 2020 Inquiry findings regarding executive information monopolies, and Dr Andrew Podger’s analysis of corporate-modelled public entities.

When a local government is treated legally as a body corporate, its executive class shifts its operational framework away from public-sector ethics and toward corporate risk management. A sophisticated administration can systematically corrupt a process—via report filtering, tactical litigation delays, or the curation of policy options—completely within its broad administrative discretion. Because these manoeuvres are perfectly 'legal' on paper, they occupy a sub-criminal void. The CCC dismisses them, the PSC devolves them, and the executive successfully uses the state’s high criminal threshold to claim absolute legal exoneration for what is, in reality, a profound subversion of democratic law.

## **62. Defining Executive and Administrative Overreach**

To complete the analytical framework of the sub-criminal void, we must establish a precise definition of executive and administrative overreach within the local government sector. Executive and administrative overreach occurs when an unelected bureaucracy systematically expands its operational authority, control over information, and decision-making dominance beyond its intended statutory boundaries, thereby subordinating the democratic authority of the elected Council and disenfranchising the local community. Unlike an overt, illegal breach of statutory law, executive overreach operates within the grey zones of broad administrative discretion granted under the *Local Government Act 1995*. It is characterized by three core structural pillars:

## **63. Monopolisation and Curation of Information**

Under the legislated architecture, the CEO is the sole statutory gatekeeper of all information flowing from the bureaucracy to the decision-makers. Overreach manifests when this gatekeeping role is used defensively rather than transparently. This involves directional reporting, where executive briefings to Council are intentionally framed, edited, or curated so that alternative policy options, negative financial risks, or independent expert counter-arguments are omitted or heavily minimized. It also involves the filtration of public input, systematically compressing or redesigning community consultation data—such as transforming overwhelming public opposition into sanitized, high-level statistical summaries—to give the false appearance of community alignment with a preferred administrative goal.

## **64. Systematic Stripping of Council Oversight**

Executive overreach aggressively capitalizes on the statutory mechanism of delegated authority. Under the Act, a Council can delegate certain functions to the CEO to foster operational efficiency. Overreach occurs when the administrative apparatus systematically expands the scope of these delegations over time to make multi-million dollar property asset, commercial leasing, or procurement decisions entirely behind closed doors. This evades public debate and formal council votes on highly contentious civic matters by re-

classifying structural changes as routine operational adjustments that fall strictly under the CEO's absolute employment or management monopoly.

## **65. Bi-Directional Inversion of Psychosocial Safety Frameworks**

Administrative overreach manifests when regulatory and internal policy frameworks—originally designed to ensure workplace safety or order—are turned outward as instruments of political and civic exclusion. This includes utilizing ratepayer-funded legal resources to apply hyper-aggressive statutory exemptions to Freedom of Information requests, deliberately delaying the release of public documents until a contentious project or decision is irreversible.

It further involves inverting internal psychosocial safety codes and Unreasonable Complainant policies to issue communication bans and lock out persistent community advocates, independent oversight groups, or reformist councillors who dare to intensely cross-examine the validity of administrative advice.

However, an architectural analysis reveals that this mechanism operates with profound bi-directional harm. By implementing defensive, adversarial corporate fortresses, the administrative apparatus actively projects and inflicts severe psychological and psychosocial risk onto the community advocates, independent oversight groups, and reformist councillors themselves. This structural reversal manifests across three distinct tactical axes:

- **The Psychological Toll of Calculated Ostracisation:** When a citizen watchdog or ratepayer association is hit with an "Unreasonable Complainant" designation, the individual is publicly and bureaucratically branded as a hazard, a bully, or a vexatious actor. This tactical labelling triggers profound reputational damage, social isolation, and acute psychological distress. The advocate bears the entire psychological weight of proving they are not a hazard, while the executive operates with total immunity behind a ratepayer-funded public relations shield.
- **The Stress of Information Starvation and Tactical Gaslighting:** Information is the psychological anchor of regulatory sanity. When a sophisticated administration systematically curates data, denies document access, or forces community members into multi-year Freedom of Information battles, it triggers severe cognitive exhaustion and anxiety. Community advocates present clear, objective evidence of administrative anomalies, but the executive hierarchy responds with boilerplate denials or uses their administrative monopoly to declare the community's forensic findings incorrect or misinformed without providing the underlying data. This endless cycle of lodging complaints, having them automatically downgraded by state agencies, and facing defensive stonewalling acts as an institutional exhaustion engine designed to break the psychological stamina of the civic participant until they abandon their oversight efforts out of sheer mental fatigue.
- **Asymmetric Legal and Financial Coercion:** The ultimate projection of psychosocial risk occurs through the asymmetric deployment of ratepayer funds to apply legal and professional pressure. A reformist councillor attempting to execute their statutory duty to oversee the local government's finances finds themselves personally exposed. If they push too hard for raw, unfiltered data, the executive class can orchestrate internal Code of Conduct complaints or threaten personal legal liability. This places an immense, asymmetric psychosocial burden directly onto the elected representative or community advocate, who must balance their civic desire for integrity against the very real, terrifying threat of personal financial ruin,

professional blacklisting, and systemic isolation. The safety apparatus is inverted so completely that the unelected executive class enjoys a stress-free, legally insulated working environment, while the democratic oversight actors are subjected to chronic, state-sanctioned psychological hostility.

#### **66. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Downgrade Chute**

The interface between the CCC and lower-tier oversight agencies exacerbates this structural weakness, creating a process where serious governance alerts are systematically neutralized.

#### **67. Automated Downgrade Mechanism**

When a community group or a whistleblower uncovers a pattern of systemic administrative manipulation and submits a detailed report to the CCC, the commission evaluates the file purely through the prism of its high criminal threshold. If the evidence does not explicitly demonstrate an indictable offense or overt criminal corruption, the CCC is statutorily prohibited from launching a full investigation.

Instead of treating the systemic manipulation as a serious structural threat to local democracy, the CCC utilizes its statutory authority under the CCM Act to down-classify the complaint. The file is automatically placed into an administrative downgrade chute, re-categorized as a minor misconduct matter, and forwarded down to the Public Sector Commission (PSC).

#### **68. Referral Trap**

Once the file lands at the PSC, the devolved architecture takes effect. The PSC, lacking field-investigation resources, immediately routes the complaint back to the council's CEO for self-investigation. This creates a highly damaging operational cycle: a data-backed integrity alert regarding executive overreach is submitted to the state's highest anti-corruption body, stripped of its adversarial teeth via a statutory threshold calculation, passed along to a passive clearinghouse, and ultimately delivered straight into the hands of the executive target. The executive is then empowered to write its own clean bill of health, utilizing the state's own bureaucratic process to insulate itself from public scrutiny.

#### **69. The City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, the CCC's high statutory threshold and the sub-criminal regulatory void function as a powerful corporate fortress for the executive administration.

#### **70. Insulation of Directional Reporting**

Shadow Council records and community analysis document numerous instances where information provided to Melville Councillors regarding major commercial zonings, land developments, and community asset divestments was heavily curated or directionally biased. When community advocates compiled comprehensive, forensic briefs highlighting these omissions and submitted them to the CCC, the commission's structural response was predetermined by its statutory architecture. Because the strategic framing of a Council report by executive staff does not violate the Criminal Code, the CCC remained legally incapable of intervening.

The Melville executive could comfortably operate within this blind spot. They understood that as long as their administrative manoeuvres remained sub-criminal, the state's supreme integrity body was structurally barred from examining the ethical validity or democratic fairness of their actions.

## 71. Public Relations Exoneration

The Melville executive has historically weaponized this statutory limitation to silence public criticism. When a complex complaint regarding administrative bias is dismissed or referred away by the CCC due to the threshold barrier, the administration does not present this as a narrow jurisdictional boundary issue.

Instead, the executive class mischaracterizes the CCC's jurisdictional dismissal as an official, merits-based clearing of their conduct. The CEO or public relations team presents the commission's standard "no further action" letter to the Council and the media as proof that the state's highest anti-corruption authority has audited and validated their administrative integrity. The CCC's statutory impotence is converted into a powerful corporate endorsement, further marginalizing community oversight and entrenching the executive monopoly.

## Summary Matrix —Crime & Corruption Commission (CCC)

The table below synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 4 investigation.

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>              | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                       | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                    | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                                          | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                                    |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Oversight Thresholds</b>           | Ultimate shield against public sector corruption, catching criminal, indictable breaches of public office.     | <b>Serious Misconduct Boundary</b><br>Statutorily restricted to offenses carrying a two-year prison sentence or overt, bad-faith corruption.                  | Systemic curation of development or asset-divestment reports sits completely unchecked because it breaks no criminal code.                                    | <b>Downgrade Chute</b><br>The CCC automatically drops sub-criminal complaints down to the minor misconduct tier, sending them straight to the PSC.                                   |
| <b>Defining Systemic Abuse</b>        | To treat corruption as any act that impairs honest, impartial, or transparent performance of public functions. | <b>Transactional Bias</b><br>Framework searches for tangible, criminal bribes or fraud, entirely ignoring the strategic manipulation of governance machinery. | Executive staff operate confidently within the grey zone, knowing that administrative reporting adjustments do not trigger coercive anti-corruption policing. | <b>PSC Defiance Loop</b><br>By narrowing the focus to criminal fraud, the CCC validates the PSC's behavioural approach of treating process corruption as minor administrative error. |
| <b>Information &amp; Transparency</b> | Exceptional coercive powers to open up hidden data pipelines, compel files, and pierce                         | <b>Discretionary Black Hole</b><br>The CCC leaves the CEO's role as the sole legal information gatekeeper un-                                                 | Forensic briefs compiled by community watchdogs tracking data filtration are dismissed without an                                                             | <b>FOI Defeat</b><br>Because the CCC ignores process corruption, local administrations use prolonged FOI legal battles to exhaust                                                    |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b> | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b> | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>   | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b> | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b> |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                          | corporate shielding.                     | audited if no criminal threshold is crossed. | open, adversarial investigation.                     | critics with systemic immunity.   |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>                 | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                                       | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                                                                                               | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Administrative Power</b>              | To keep the operational mechanics of the public service subordinate to state laws and high integrity benchmarks.               | <b>Bi-Directional Inversion of Psychosocial Harm</b><br>Psychosocial safety frameworks are weaponised outward to exclude critics, while actively projecting severe psychological trauma, stress, and anxiety back onto community watchdogs and reformist councillors through systemic gaslighting and legal coercion. | High-density zoning or commercial rezonings are pushed through using heavily filtered data, while civic watchdogs bear severe reputational and emotional exhaustion attempting to extract underlying ground-truth. | <b>WorkSafe Co-optation</b><br>The structural blind spot surrounding bi-directional harm allows local government executives to use workplace safety systems as political exclusion tools without state intervention. |
| <b>Public Trust &amp; Accountability</b> | To protect public trust by exposing official wrongdoing and providing an independent avenue of appeal for the civic community. | <b>Endorsement Inversion</b><br>Jurisdictional dismissals and standard referral letters are structurally inverted to serve as corporate shields for the executive.                                                                                                                                                    | The administration presents standard CCC "no further action" letters to the media as an official, merits-based state exoneration of their integrity.                                                               | <b>Complete Insulation</b><br>The downgrade process moves the file from the CCC to the PSC, which hands it to the CEO, ensuring the administrative target controls the final verdict.                                |

## Chapter 5

### State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) & Planning/Building Oversight Frameworks

#### 72. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004* (WA), the **State Administrative Tribunal (SAT)** is established as a centralized, independent authority designed to resolve administrative, commercial, and planning disputes in Western Australia. In the context of local government, the SAT holds primary jurisdiction under Part 14 of the *Planning and Development Act 2005* (WA) and the *Building Act 2011* (WA) to conduct merits reviews of municipal planning determinations, building permit refusals, building compliance notices, demolition orders, and structural enforcement directives.

The legislative intent behind the SAT is to provide an informal, fast, and cost-effective mechanism to review the decisions of public authorities *de novo* (afresh). This means the Tribunal steps into the shoes of the original decision-maker, re-evaluating the planning or development merits of an application on its objective substance rather than its strict legal form.

This review process is reinforced by higher-tier planning and building frameworks, including the Western Australian Planning Commission (WAPC), Joint Development Assessment Panels (JDAPs), and the Building Services Board. These mechanisms are statutorily intended to decouple developmental assessments and building compliance from local political bias, ensuring that structural growth and safety remain bound to objective, state-standard guidelines.

### **73. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness**

While the SAT possesses immense quasi-judicial power to alter, set aside, or substitute a local government's active planning or building decision, its operational framework contains a major architectural flaw: it evaluates only the technical correctness of an *affirmative, reviewable decision*, remaining completely blind to the integrity of the internal bureaucratic process and functionally powerless against **systemic administrative inaction or refusal to enforce building laws**.

This structural weakness creates a two-tiered system of executive insulation, heavily impacting small domestic building disputes:

### **74. Illusion of Mandamus and Discretionary Inaction**

A profound systemic failure occurs when a local government acts with distinct bias by refusing to issue rectification notices or enforcement orders against a non-compliant building work. When a home-owner or neighbour uncovers severe building non-compliance that breaches the *Building Act 2011* or the Building Code of Australia, they turn to the local council as the primary permit and enforcement authority.

However, if the municipal executive decides—due to internal relationships, developer proximity, or protective bureaucratic culture—to ignore the non-compliance, the SAT framework offers **zero direct appeal pathway for the affected citizen**.

The SAT is structurally designed to review *actions taken* (such as the issuance of a building order). It does not function as a court of mandamus that can compel a local government executive to perform their statutory duty. If the City chooses to do nothing, there is no "reviewable decision" under the Act. The executive's discretionary inaction creates an absolute administrative dead-end, leaving the biased refusal to enforce safety laws entirely insulated from independent oversight.

### **75. Monopoly Over Technical Evidence and RAR Curation**

When an affirmative planning or building profile is initiated, the executive bureaucracy holds absolute control over the compilation of the record. They are the sole authors of the Technical Reports and the Responsible Authority Reports (RARs) presented to Council, the JDAP, or the Tribunal.

Oversight failure manifests through three core curation mechanisms:

- **Asymmetric Report Curation:** Sophisticated executives frame these technical profiles to favour a preferred administrative or developer outcome, selectively highlighting data that aligns with their desired goal while systematically editing out independent expert counter-arguments or engineering deficits.

- **Sanitisation of Community Feedback:** While local governments are legally mandated to conduct public consultation, the executive controls the synthesis of this data. Overwhelming public opposition is routinely compressed, re-categorized, or translated into sanitized, high-level statistical indices inside the final report, giving external panels or the SAT the false appearance of community alignment.
- **Limitations of De Novo Review:** When a planning dispute escalates to the SAT, the Tribunal's jurisdiction is strictly bounded by whether a formal statutory trigger exists. It cannot function as an anti-corruption audit board. If a community group or a reformist councillor presents detailed evidence showing that an executive administration deliberately falsified or directionally curated the underlying report to mislead the panel, the SAT routinely rules such arguments irrelevant to its mandate. It reviews whether the finalized decision conforms to the text of the Planning Scheme, leaving the corruption of policy and procedure insulated from judicial review.

#### **76. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Planning/Building Void**

The planning and building oversight layers operate in siloed isolation from the state's primary integrity watchdogs, creating an administrative gap that local executives easily exploit.

#### **77. SAT-CCC Separation**

The Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) maintains a strict evidentiary focus on overt criminal or statutory corruption. When a citizen watchdog group or an individual homeowner compiles a comprehensive brief demonstrating a pattern of deliberate report filtering, data suppression, or biased refusal to issue building rectification orders, the CCC declines to intervene.

Because the decision to enforce or ignore a domestic building breach falls within the broad, lawful administrative discretion of the CEO and their building surveyors, it does not violate the Criminal Code or cross the threshold of serious misconduct. The CCC dismisses it as a sub-criminal planning matter, ensuring that process corruption within local building departments is systematically insulated from anti-corruption policing.

#### **78. Ratepayer-Funded Litigation Asymmetry**

The structural isolation of the SAT is heavily weaponized through the deployment of municipal budgets. Under its status as a body corporate, a local government executive can deploy substantial, ratepayer-funded legal resources and hire expensive external consultants to defend its curated reports or its refusal to act at SAT mediation and hearings.

Independent community groups or individual citizens possess no equivalent public funding channel. This extreme resource asymmetry transforms the SAT track from a fair, cost-effective administrative review into an exhaustion engine. The local executive can comfortably engage in protracted litigation to out-muscle and financially drain its community critics, secure in the knowledge that no regulatory body (neither the DLGSC nor the PSC) will audit the ethical or democratic validity of spending public rates to defeat public transparency.

### **79. City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, the curation of technical documentation, the structural limitations of the SAT, and the weaponisation of administrative inaction manifest as an active tool used to protect preferred interests and insulate the executive from accountability.

### **80. Shielding of Domestic Non-Compliance**

Historical records and community monitoring concerning the City of Melville highlight an environment where small domestic building disputes expose the complete absence of independent state recourse. When individual ratepayers identified clear structural non-compliance in neighbouring developments that violated statutory building approvals, the Melville executive repeatedly exercised its administrative discretion to downplay the breaches or refuse to issue formal rectification notices.

Because the Melville administration chose not to act, the affected residents found themselves completely blocked from appealing to the SAT, as no reviewable decision existed. The City could confidently apply administrative bias, secure in the knowledge that the state's quasi-judicial framework provided the community with no mechanism to force a recalcitrant municipal authority to execute the law.

### **81. Defeating Appeals via Technical Neutralisation**

In instances where an affirmative decision did trigger an appeal track, the Melville executive administration deployed extensive legal teams to defend the technical validity of their actions. The SAT, operating within its narrow parameters, reviewed the technical text of the planning or building codes rather than the integrity of the bureaucratic process that produced the files.

By ensuring that their administrative manoeuvres remained perfectly legal on paper, the Melville executive could safely use the SAT as a formal mechanism to cleanse their curated data or justify their regulatory passivity. The Tribunal's eventual ruling on technical compliance was weaponized by the administration's public relations team as an official state validation of their integrity, effectively silencing community critics and locking in controversial outcomes long before the underlying manipulation could be exposed.

## **Summary Matrix —State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) & Planning Frameworks**

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 5 investigation.

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>               | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                                            | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                                   | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                            | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                 |
|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Statutory Jurisdiction</b>          | To provide a fast, informal, and cost-effective <i>de novo</i> merits review of administrative, planning, and building decisions.   | <b>Merits Blindness to Process</b><br>Evaluates only the technical correctness of the final decision, completely blind to the bureaucratic manipulation behind the evidence. | Curated reports and structural models are legally cleansed through the review track, ignoring background executive bias.                        | <b>SAT-CCC Separation</b><br>The CCC refuses to investigate report curation because it falls within broad administrative discretion, leaving a sub-criminal void. |
| <b>Enforcement &amp; Rectification</b> | An absolute statutory duty to enforce building safety laws and issue rectification notices neutrally when non-compliance is proven. | <b>Discretionary Inaction Dead-End</b><br>The SAT cannot compel a council to act if it refuses to issue an order, leaving biased administrative passivity un-reviewable.     | The executive routinely downplays or ignores domestic building breaches, blocking affected residents from accessing any SAT appeal pathway.     | <b>Mandamus Gap</b><br>The absence of a statutory trigger for administrative refusal to act allows municipal permit authorities to operate above judicial review. |
| <b>Evidence &amp; Reporting</b>        | Objective, balanced Technical Reports and RARs that capture raw ground-truth data for transparent decision-making.                  | <b>Asymmetric Report Curation</b><br>The executive holds a total monopoly over authorships, selectively editing out independent risks or infrastructure deficits.            | Independent environmental, planning, or traffic risk profiles compiled by community watchdogs are systematically filtered out of final agendas. | <b>JDAP/WAPC Capture</b><br>External state panels rely entirely on local executive reports, rendering them highly vulnerable to pre-packaged data curation.       |
| <b>Resource Dynamics</b>               | To offer an equal, accessible, and balanced dispute resolution platform for ordinary citizens and public authorities.               | <b>Litigation Asymmetry</b><br>The executive deploys substantial, ratepayer-funded legal budgets and experts to out-muscle community critics.                                | The City utilizes ratepayer funds to hire senior counsel to defend controversial rezonings against the very community funding the council.      | <b>Exhaustion Engine</b><br>The combination of long SAT mediation schedules and unlimited corporate budgets breaks the financial stamina of citizen groups.       |

| Diagnostic Vector           | Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)                                                                                                   | Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)                                                                                                                   | Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)                                                                                            | Inter-Agency Intersections                                                                                                                                                         |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Democratic Oversight</b> | To ensure elected directors can actively review planning and building assessments to protect the public interest of their district. | <b>Information Blockade</b><br>Councillors are legally starved of independent research units, forcing total reliance on the CEO's curated data files. | Reformist councillors are blocked from accessing raw financial or engineering models, disabling their capacity to perform due diligence. | <b>Corporate Fortress Alignment</b><br>By treating the municipality as a commercial body corporate, the architecture isolates planning data from genuine democratic interrogation. |

## Chapter 6

### Department of Water and Environmental Regulation (DWER), Department of Health (DoH) & The "Dual-Hat" Conflict

#### 82. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *Environmental Protection Act 1986* (WA), the *Contaminated Sites Act 2003* (WA), and the *Public Health Act 2016* (WA), the **Department of Water and Environmental Regulation (DWER)** and the **Department of Health (DoH)** are established as the supreme state authorities responsible for environmental preservation and public health safeguards in Western Australia. The statutory intent of this dual framework is to ensure that communities are protected from hazardous pollution, contaminated lands, acoustic disturbances, and public health threats.

To execute this massive regulatory footprint, both statutes explicitly incorporate local government authorities as key co-regulators, relying on municipal administrations to perform frontline monitoring, licensing, and enforcement. Under this framework, **Environmental Health Officers (EHOs)** and local environmental officers are authorized under state law to investigate breaches, issue environmental protection notices, manage noise regulations, and enforce public health directives. The statutory architecture assumes a fluid, cooperative model where localized inspectors serve as the frontline eyes and ears of independent state-level regulators.

#### 83. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness

When tested against the unique corporate reality of the local government sector, this delegated model collapses into a severe institutional conflict of interest known as the **"dual-hat" conflict**. This architectural vulnerability occurs because EHOs are forced to operate as state-authorized law enforcement officers while simultaneously serving as subordinate employees within a municipal corporate structure controlled by the Chief Executive Officer.

#### **84. Employment Monopoly vs. Statutory Duty**

Under the *Local Government Act 1995*, the CEO possesses absolute and exclusive statutory control over the employment, career progression, salary, and daily direction of all municipal staff. If a frontline EHO uncovers a severe environmental or public health breach, their capacity to execute their statutory duties is heavily compromised if the perpetrator of the breach is the local government entity itself.

Municipalities are major operators of public infrastructure, waste facilities, drainage networks, and contaminated land sites. When a council-managed site causes a localized public health hazard or environmental contamination, the EHO is placed in an impossible professional position. They are structurally disincentivised from aggressively deploying coercive enforcement mechanisms—such as improvement notices or infringement penalties—against their own employer.

If an EHO attempts to execute an objective, adversarial investigation into a municipal facility, the executive hierarchy can use its absolute management monopoly to quietly reassign the officer, alter their funding, or filter their technical findings before they reach the council chamber or state regulators. The statutory enforcement mechanism is effectively swallowed by the corporate hierarchy.

The structural collapse of this delegated enforcement model is a textbook example of what former Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) WA Chairman Dr Paul Vogel defines as 'Regulatory Capture via Subordinate Bureaucracies.' Vogel's environmental policy frameworks demonstrate that state-level desk-bound regulators become functionally blind when they rely on localized inspectors who are simultaneously trapped within a corporate hierarchy.

Because Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) are directly subordinate to the CEO's absolute employment monopoly, they face immediate professional risks if they aggressively enforce state contamination or public health directives against their own employer. As Dr Vogel's research highlights, this structural conflict ensures that when a council-managed asset causes severe contamination, the administrative apparatus can easily filter, edit, or suppress technical findings before they reach the public, transforming independent scientific reporting into an exercise in liability containment.

#### **85. State's Deferral Loophole**

The structural failure is cemented by the operational passivity of DWER and the DoH. Because both state-level departments are desk-bound and chronically under-resourced, they do not maintain active, independent field inspectorates to police municipal operations.

When a community group or a whistleblower bypasses the local council and submits a detailed report of a municipal environmental hazard directly to DWER or the DoH, the state authorities apply an automated deferral loop. They review the folder and route it right back down to the local government's internal environmental health department for investigation and comment. This completes an absurd accountability cycle: the state relies on the target entity's own subordinate staff to investigate and report on whether their employer has committed an environmental or public health offense.

#### **86. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Accountability Void**

The siloed nature of the environmental health layer isolates municipal operations from broader integrity and transparency policing, creating a vast regulatory grey zone.

#### **87. Separation from Integrity Agencies**

The Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) and the Public Sector Commission (PSC) remain completely blind to the "dual-hat" conflict. If an executive administration pressures an internal EHO to tone down a contamination report or ignore a public health hazard inside a municipal asset to protect the council from financial liability or public fallout, this administrative manipulation is treated as a routine management exercise.

Because the directive is executed within the CEO's broad statutory power to direct staff, it rarely triggers a minor or serious misconduct investigation. The state's primary integrity frameworks fail to recognize that the subversion of environmental and health laws via internal corporate pressure constitutes a profound form of process and policy corruption.

#### **88. Absence of Independent Appellate Channels**

If an EHO's technical advice is overridden or suppressed by senior executive management, public service protections offer no functional safe-harbor to protect the integrity of their scientific reporting. The officer cannot appeal to an independent environmental ombudsman because no such office exists in Western Australia. The structural divide ensures that while the technical standards written by DWER and the DoH are highly rigorous on paper, their frontline application is entirely subordinate to the risk-management and public relations priorities of the local government executive class.

#### **89. City of Melville as a Case Study: John Connell Reserve and the Dundee Road Landfill**

The reality of the "dual-hat" conflict, the state's automated deferral loop, and the systematic insulation of corporate liabilities find an explicit, contemporary expression in the City of Melville's management of **John Connell Reserve** and the former **Dundee Road Landfill**.

#### **90. Decades of Administrative Inertia**

The Dundee Road Landfill site operated as a municipal tip from 1974 until it was decommissioned in 2000. In 2013, acting under the *Contaminated Sites Act 2003*, the state authority (DWER) officially classified parts of the John Connell Reserve as **"Contaminated — Remediation Required"** due to the documented presence of construction and domestic waste, asbestos-containing materials, and heavy metals. The state framework mandated that remediation work was required to protect public health and safety.

Despite this formal state directive, the City of Melville's executive administration has presided over decades of structural inertia. The remediation work mandated in 2013 remains uncompleted. Because local environmental health staff answer directly to the CEO's corporate hierarchy rather than an independent regulatory pipeline, the administration has successfully deferred major remediation expenditures and prolonged environmental testing, managing the contamination site through defensive, long-term administrative delays rather than proactive execution of state safety directives.

#### **91. Shielding of Site Operations and Environmental Contradictions**

The systemic failure of localized oversight becomes acutely manifest when community advocates and resident groups step in to perform the due diligence abandoned by the regulator. When local watchdogs compiled forensic ground-truth data—documenting that the unsealed site featured thin or absent soil capping (less than 50cm in critical zones) and raised public alarms that the contaminated reserve was being utilized to deposit materials close to active sporting grounds—the executive administration immediately deployed its corporate defence shield.

The City’s executive denied illegal dumping, reframing the activity as a safe, internal operational storage mechanism, while internal technical staff remained structurally incapable of contradicting the administration's public relations narrative.

Furthermore, while the site sat un-remediated under the state's contamination notice, the City's executive successfully pushed through a major project to remove over 200 mature trees and native bushland at the reserve to establish a new sporting pitch. During the council debate, community watchdogs flagged that the clearing intersected a Threatened Ecological Community (TEC) protected under DWER clearing permits.

However, because the internal environmental and compliance officers operate within the CEO’s employment monopoly, they could not issue independent stop-work or protection directives against their own organization. The administration could push through its preferred developmental outcomes while completely silencing the qualitative ecological alerts raised by the community.

**92. Bypassing State Oversight via the Deferral Loop**

When frustrated civic groups—such as the Bull Creek-Leeming Community Action Group—attempted to bypass Melville's administrative fortress by petitioning the State Government to strip the City of Melville of its management order and force DWER to properly decommission the landfill, the state's fragmented architecture protected the status quo.

Desk-bound state regulators at DWER and the Department of Health routinely defer to the local authority's internal timelines, allowing the Melville executive to manage the contamination via a drawn-out, self-directed "Master Plan" process projected out to 2027. The state's automated deferral loop accepts the corporate compliance paperwork of the City at face value, leaving the community with no independent state umpire to pierce the corporate monopoly and enforce the objective intent of environmental health laws.

**Summary Matrix — DWER & DoH Frameworks**

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 6 investigation.

| Diagnostic Vector | Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)                                                                                       | Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)                                                                                                             | Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)                                                                                        | Inter-Agency Intersections                                                                                                                       |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Statutory Mandate | Frontline environmental and public health enforcement co-regulated by independent state watchdogs and local inspectors. | "Dual-Hat" Conflict<br>Authorized enforcement officers are subordinate corporate employees entirely dependent on the CEO's employment monopoly. | Internal EHOs are structurally disincentivised from aggressively investigating or penalizing environmental failures on council land. | Automated Deferral Loop<br>DWER and DoH route community alerts directly back to the targeted council, relying on the executive to police itself. |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>    | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                           | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                            | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                         | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                 |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Operational Efficacy</b> | Objective, adversarial field monitoring to protect communities from hazardous pollution and public health threats. | <b>Administrative Suppression</b><br>The executive hierarchy can use its management powers to filter, edit, or suppress technical findings before they reach council. | Technical profiles regarding the Dundee Road Landfill are curated to minimize corporate liability and justify decades of remediation delays. | <b>Integrity Blind Spot</b><br>The CCC and PSC ignore the internal manipulation of EHO reporting, classifying it as routine corporate management. |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>            | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                                               | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                                  | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                  | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                         |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Contaminated Sites Execution</b> | Independent state triggers that legally compel public authorities to execute immediate remediation work on high-risk land.             | <b>Discretionary Delay Shield</b><br>State-issued contamination notices are neutralized by local executives who stretch out testing timelines over decades without penalty. | The City has deferred active remediation at John Connell Reserve since its 2013 "Remediation Required" state classification.          | <b>Regulatory Void</b><br>DWER relies on desk-bound self-reporting, allowing the Melville executive to manage a toxic site via un-policed draft master plans.             |
| <b>Environmental Conservation</b>   | Absolute adherence to state clearing permits to protect native bushland and Threatened Ecological Communities (TECs) from destruction. | <b>In-Group Compliance Cleanse</b><br>Internal conservation teams are muted by the executive hierarchy when council development goals conflict with environmental codes.    | The council approves the destruction of over 200 mature trees on a toxic landfill site, over-ruling qualitative community objections. | <b>Information Blockade</b><br>By controlling the internal EHO data pipeline, the executive prevents elected councillors from accessing uncurated risk models.            |
| <b>Public Trust &amp; Oversight</b> | To ensure public land remains safe for community use and that public health administration is subordinate to community democracy.      | <b>Corporate Defence Shield</b><br>State-level regulatory passivity allows the local executive to use basic compliance paperwork to deflect public scrutiny.                | The executive presents its internal material storage policies to deny illegal dumping alerts raised by local community action groups. | <b>Complete Insulation</b><br>The separation of environmental law from governance law ensures that process corruption in municipal health departments remains un-policed. |

## Chapter 7

### WorkSafe WA & The Inverted Safety Fortress

#### 93. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *Work Health and Safety Act 2020* (WA) (the WHS Act), **WorkSafe WA** is established as the state's supreme regulator for workplace health and safety. Its foundational statutory mandate is to protect workers and other persons against harm to

their health, safety, and welfare through the elimination or minimization of risks arising from work.

The WHS Act places equal legislative emphasis on physical and **psychosocial health**, defining "health" explicitly as both physical and psychological well-being. Under **Section 7** of the Act, the definition of a **"worker"** explicitly includes volunteers who carry out work in any capacity for a Person Conducting a Business or Undertaking (PCBU). Furthermore, **Section 8** expands the definition of a **"workplace"** to encompass any location where a worker carries out work—including the worker's own home.

The clear legislative intent is that any individual performing community, advisory, or civic functions on behalf of a municipal corporation is statutorily protected from psychological hostility, organizational bullying, and psychosocial hazards, regardless of whether they are paid or operating from a private residence.

#### **94. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness**

When isolated to the local government sector, the operational mechanics of the WHS Act reveal a profound structural vulnerability. Because the legislation grants operational authority to the PCBU—represented at the municipal level by the Chief Executive Officer—the framework is highly susceptible to tactical inversion and statutory evasion. Rather than acting as a shield to protect community-facing workers and volunteers from harm, the broad definitions of psychosocial hazards are systematically inverted by sophisticated local government executives to build an un-auditable corporate fortress.

#### **95. Manufactured Registration Barrier**

A key mechanism of administrative overreach is the invention of extra-legislative compliance barriers, such as mandatory "volunteer registration" protocols. While the WHS Act protects any person performing voluntary work for a PCBU without any reference to a formal registry, local government executives implement internal policies requiring community watchdogs, resident association members, or advisory committee participants to be formally registered.

This requirement does not exist in the legislation. By erecting this pseudo-legal policy barrier, the executive class can unilaterally strip civic watchdogs of their statutory rights as volunteer workers under the Act. It allows the administration to claim it owes no duty of care to protect the mental health of an un-registered community advocate who is working from home to compile forensic governance reports, while simultaneously using the exact same safety codes to claim that the advocate's research creates a psychosocial hazard for internal staff.

#### **96. Inversion of Scrutiny and Lockout Mechanics**

When a persistent community advocate or a reformist councillor performs rigorous due diligence—such as intensely cross-examining a directionally biased report or issuing repetitive requests for raw data—the executive hierarchy recharacterizes this democratic scrutiny. The CEO claims that the intensity, tone, or volume of public interrogation causes psychological distress to staff. Once the executive frames civic accountability as a workplace safety risk, they deploy a series of highly restrictive administrative measures under the guise of statutory compliance:

- **Communication Bans:** Restricting an advocate to a single, heavily curated email address monitored exclusively by senior management, cutting off access to frontline staff.

- **Building Lockouts:** Issuing trespass or restricted entry notices to bar community critics from accessing municipal premises.
- **Chamber Restrictions:** Restricting public question time or framing intensive councillor interrogation as a behavioural breach that violates the CEO's duty to provide a safe workplace.

#### **97. Spatial Blind Spot: Environmental Intimidation in the Council Chamber**

A critical, unexamined failure of the WorkSafe oversight framework is its complete blindness to environmental and spatial hazards within the physical layout of local government council chambers. Under the WHS framework, an employer's duty to manage psychosocial health explicitly encompasses the physical environment where work is done, including the layout of furniture, structures, and the presence of fixed human barriers.

In a standard democratic parliament or high-level corporate board, an adversarial and structural separation is physically maintained between unelected administrative staff, public advisors, and the democratic decision-makers. In the unique and highly controlled space of a municipal council chamber, this spatial boundary is systematically erased.

#### **98. Layout of Administrative Surveillance**

The physical layout of the chamber frequently places the Chief Executive Officer and senior directors permanently on the main dais, sitting directly alongside, facing down, or positioned immediately behind the elected councillors. This spatial arrangement is not an accidental logistical design; it is a calculated behavioural mechanism:

- **Psychological Pressure Engine:** Having senior executive staff permanently entrenched inside the voting and debating arc functions as a live system of psychological surveillance. When a councillor speaks, debates, or questions an administrative report, they are subjected to immediate, proximity-based non-verbal pressure, physical dominance, and administrative scrutiny from the very authors of the reports.
- **Muzzling of Chamber Debate:** This constant spatial oversight heavily restricts the cognitive autonomy of the chamber floor. It strips the elected directors of the quiet, un-intimidated spatial separation required to deliberate transparently, query numbers, and challenge executive overreach without feeling physically managed by the bureaucracy.

#### **99. WorkSafe's Total Blindness**

WorkSafe WA remains entirely blind to this environmental threat. Because the regulator approaches psychosocial safety through generic, desk-bound industrial forms, it evaluates the council chamber merely as a standard corporate office with desks and chairs. It possesses no technical framework to recognize that the physical, permanent placement of unelected executives inside a democratic debating arc constitutes an ongoing environmental and psychosocial hazard to the workers (the councillors) trying to perform their statutory duties. By ignoring how spatial design is co-opted to enforce bureaucratic dominance, WorkSafe passively validates a layout that enforces political compliance through physical and environmental intimidation.

#### **100. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Bi-Directional Harm**

WorkSafe WA operates within a strict occupational boundary, creating a massive regulatory blind spot that local government executives easily exploit to inflict bi-directional harm.

### **101. WorkSafe-PSC Loophole**

When the Public Sector Commission (PSC) receives a minor misconduct complaint, its devolved architecture forces it to refer the file right back to the local council's CEO. This procedural referral routinely exposes the identity of internal whistleblowers or critical staff to the executive hierarchy. Once exposed, the CEO can immediately weaponize WorkSafe's psychosocial safety codes against that individual, filing internal claims that the whistleblower's actions are causing workplace disruption or stress to the management team. WorkSafe, viewing the matter purely through a narrow industrial lens, accepts the PCBU's internal safety profiling without auditing whether the safety framework is being used punitively to silence an integrity threat.

### **102. Projection of Psychosocial Risk**

The ultimate systemic failure of this layout is that WorkSafe is completely blind to how the local executive's defensive corporate fortress projects severe psychosocial harm back onto community advocates, watchdogs, and reformist councillors. WorkSafe's jurisdiction stops at the boundary of what the PCBU defines as its authorized workforce. Because WorkSafe defers to the local authority's internal policy that an advocate is not a registered volunteer, it refuses to investigate when an administration causes acute psychological distress, social isolation, and reputational damage to an unpaid community volunteer who has been publicly branded a workplace hazard.

State regulators like the DLGSC refuse to intervene, stating that workplace health and safety protocols fall strictly under the domain of WorkSafe WA. This vertical and horizontal buck-passing ensures that an unelected bureaucracy can safely deploy ratepayer funds to legally out-muscle, isolate, and psychologically exhaust its democratic critics, while WorkSafe's passive operational structure validates the lockdown as a legitimate exercise of safety management.

### **103. The City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, the weaponisation of psychosocial safety frameworks, the deployment of manufactured compliance barriers, and physical chamber dynamics transform from a structural vulnerability into an active mechanism of civic exclusion.

### **104. "Psychosocial Hazard" Fortress**

Historical records and community monitoring concerning the City of Melville highlight a local governance environment where robust civic advocacy or intense councillor interrogation of administrative advice has been systematically recharacterized as an operational safety threat. When independent watchdogs compiled comprehensive briefs exposing governance failures or pushed for unfiltered transparency during contentious commercial and land-use developments, the executive administration repeatedly leveraged internal policies—such as restrictive Unreasonable Complainant frameworks and restricted communication protocols—by framing these actions as necessary steps to protect staff from psychological distress. By insisting that these independent watchdogs are not registered volunteers, the Melville executive successfully isolates them from the protections of the WHS Act while simultaneously subjecting them to the full force of its exclusionary mechanisms.

### **105. Spatial Dominance Over the Melville Chamber**

The Melville context demonstrates that this environmental safety fortress is actively deployed inward to isolate elected representatives. When reform-minded councillors

attempted to execute their statutory duty to intensely scrutinize multi-million dollar asset allocations or challenge the validity of executive advice, the permanent physical positioning of senior directors on the main dais functioned as a tool of un-interrupted administrative oversight.

By threatening councillors with code of conduct violations or claiming that aggressive interrogation violated the CEO's duty to provide a safe workplace under the WHS Act, the administration engineered a severe chilling effect. The safety apparatus was inverted so completely that the unelected executive class enjoyed an un-scrutinized, stress-free working environment, while the elected directors of the municipality bore the entire psychological weight of professional isolation and spatial intimidation just for executing their democratic mandate.

### Summary Matrix — WorkSafe WA

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 7 investigation.

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>   | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                        | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                      | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                       | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                         |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Statutory Mandate</b>   | To protect all workers, explicitly including volunteers working from home, from physical and psychosocial harm. | <b>Safety Inversion</b><br>Psychosocial safety codes are inverted outward by the executive to serve as a corporate shield against civic and political scrutiny. | Robust community advocacy and intense councillor scrutiny are recharacterized as operational safety hazards to justify communication bans. | <b>WorkSafe Blind Spot</b><br>WorkSafe operates on a narrow industrial axis, evaluating only the PCBU's safety forms while remaining blind to political lockout tactics.  |
| <b>Executive Authority</b> | Imposes a strict duty of care to protect anyone performing community or civic functions on behalf of a PCBU.    | <b>Manufactured Barrier</b><br>The CEO invents extra-legislative requirements like "volunteer registration" to strip critics of their statutory WHS rights.     | The City applies "Unreasonable Complainant" policies to deny that independent watchdogs are legitimate volunteers owed a duty of care.     | <b>PSC Referral Trap</b><br>When the PSC chutes an alert back to the CEO, the executive can immediately use safety codes to target and isolate the exposed whistleblower. |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>                       | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                                         | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                                      | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                                   | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                           |
|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Environment Design &amp; Spatial Layout</b> | To design physical work environments that eliminate psychological stress, intimidation, and unauthorized surveillance.           | <b>Spatial Intimidation</b><br>Unelected executives are permanently positioned inside the debating arc to enforce administrative dominance over councillors.                    | The physical proximity of senior directors on the dais is weaponised to project non-verbal pressure, muzzling free speech and raw due diligence.       | <b>WorkSafe Spatial Blindness</b><br>WorkSafe treats the chamber as a standard desk office, completely blind to how spatial layouts function as psychological muzzles.      |
| <b>Directional Impact</b>                      | To stop the projection of harmful managerial stress downward onto subordinate public sector workers and volunteers.              | <b>Bi-Directional Projection of Harm</b><br>The executive's defensive fortress actively inflicts severe psychological stress, anxiety, and social isolation onto civic critics. | Unpaid community watchdogs bear intense emotional and reputational exhaustion while attempting to challenge a ratepayer-funded PR shield.              | <b>DLGSC Abdication</b><br>The DLGSC refuses to scrutinize localized communication bans, deferring entirely to the CEO's broad workplace safety discretion.                 |
| <b>Chamber Dynamics</b>                        | To ensure a safe, collaborative chamber floor where elected officials can freely debate public policy and perform due diligence. | <b>Chilling Effect</b><br>Adversarial questioning of executive reports by councillors is labelled as "workplace bullying," silencing rigorous legislative debate.               | Reformist councillors are forced to self-censor or face code of conduct breaches for intensely interrogating flawed administrative advice.             | <b>Legislative Paradox</b><br>The WHS Act is weaponised to override the councillor's statutory right under <b>Section 2.7</b> to oversee municipal policies and operations. |
| <b>Public Trust &amp; Oversight</b>            | To foster a transparent working culture where public administration remains subordinate to community democracy.                  | <b>Evasion of Duty</b><br>Internal registration policies are used to bypass the clear statutory expansions of the 2020 WHS Act regarding home-based volunteer work.             | The executive successfully utilizes ratepayer funds to build a stress-free administrative monopoly, completely detached from community accountability. | <b>Regulatory Void</b><br>The separation of safety law from governance law ensures that process corruption executed under the guise of safety remains entirely un-policed.  |

# Chapter 8

## Office of the Auditor General (OAG) & The Retrospective Fiscal Void

### 106. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *Auditor General Act 2006* (WA) and subsequent legislative extensions, the **Office of the Auditor General (OAG)** is established as an independent officer of Parliament. The foundational statutory intent of the OAG framework is to provide the Governor, Parliament, and the taxpayers of Western Australia with independent, objective, and robust assurances regarding the financial health, operational efficiency, and legislative compliance of public sector agencies.

In 2017, the State Government passed the *Local Government Amendment (Auditing) Act 2017*, structurally expanding the Auditor General's mandate to encompass the local government sector. This reform was intended to dismantle the historical reliance on private, council-appointed commercial auditors and replace them with a centralized, supreme state audit authority.

The legislative philosophy underpinning this expansion was clear: to bring the multi-billion dollar municipal sector under the same forensic, performance-auditing rigor applied to core state government departments. The OAG was tasked with conducting annual financial audits and independent performance audits to ensure that public ratepayer funds are deployed with absolute transparency, economy, and efficiency. The statutory design positions the OAG as the supreme financial watchdog, treating rigorous fiscal accountability as a non-negotiable pillar of democratic local governance.

### 107. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness

When isolated to the local government sector, the operational mechanics of the OAG framework reveal a profound structural disconnect. Rather than acting as a dynamic, preventative shield against financial malpractice or administrative overreach, the framework functions primarily as a retrospective historian. This systemic weakness is driven by a narrow statutory focus and an acute absence of coercive, state-backed correction.

### 108. Retrospective Scope (The Historian Trap)

The definitive operational limitation of the OAG layer is its retrospective nature. By structural design, an audit can only examine historical data—evaluating financial transactions, ledger balances, and operational decisions long after the money has been spent and the contracts executed.

Sophisticated local government executives treat this temporal lag as an effective administrative buffer. They are fully aware that the OAG will not intercept a highly questionable procurement process or flag a directionally biased business case in real-time. By the time the OAG reviews the files and publishes its annual findings, the political and democratic utility of the critique is severely diminished. The project is already built, the ratepayer funds are gone, and the administration has shifted its focus to subsequent budget cycles.

### **109. Absence of Coercive Correction (The Treasury Disconnect)**

Unlike core state government departments that are bound to strict Treasury controls, local governments enjoy a unique level of fiscal independence. State departments rely heavily on direct budget allocations from the consolidated revenue fund; if the OAG uncovers severe financial inefficiencies or systemic non-compliance within a state department, the Government can enforce compliance by threatening to withhold funding or restructuring the agency's internal leadership.

Local governments, conversely, raise their own independent revenue directly from ratepayers via property taxation. This financial autonomy creates a severe regulatory gap:

- **The Fiscal Immunity:** Because a local council does not rely on State Treasury funding to survive, its executive administration can comfortably ignore or downplay critical OAG reports without facing any immediate fiscal penalty.
- **The Recommendations Loop:** The OAG possesses immense power to uncover operational deficiencies, but it lacks the statutory authority to impose penalties, issue fines, or fire non-compliant executives. Its output is limited to making recommendations, leaving the actual implementation of those corrections entirely dependent on the willingness of the very executive hierarchy being critiqued.

### **110. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Accountability Void**

The OAG operates in complete isolation from the state's primary regulatory, disciplinary, and anti-corruption frameworks, creating an administrative fragmentation that local executives easily manoeuvre through.

### **111. OAG-DLGSC Disconnect**

The Department of Local Government, Sport and Cultural Industries (DLGSC) and the Local Government Inspectorate refuse to act as an enforcement arm for the OAG's performance audits. When the OAG publishes a sweeping report highlighting widespread deficiencies in municipal corporate card use or asset management, the DLGSC treats these findings as advisory "capacity-building" data rather than triggers for mandatory regulatory intervention.

The regulator does not launch Part 8 inquiries or suspend executive delegations based on OAG critiques. This horizontal wall ensures that when an OAG audit exposes systemic operational failures, the broader governance breakdown falls into an un-policed regulatory void between the auditor and the regulator.

### **112. Shield Against Misconduct Scrutiny**

Because the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) and the Public Sector Commission (PSC) focus strictly on criminal thresholds or individualized behavioural breaches, they routinely ignore the process deficiencies uncovered by the OAG. A local government executive can preside over a shambolic procurement process or mismanage millions of dollars in infrastructure assets as documented by the OAG.

However, because this mismanagement is executed within the CEO's broad, lawful administrative discretion, it rarely triggers a minor or serious misconduct investigation. The state's integrity frameworks remain blind to the reality that systemic fiscal incompetence and the deliberate erosion of internal financial controls function as a powerful shield for administrative insulation.

### **113. City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, the retrospective limitations of the OAG and the absence of coercive correction manifest as a highly effective corporate shield that protects the administration from genuine external accountability.

### **114. Clean Financial Audits as a Technical Shield**

The City of Melville's corporate tracking measures its fiscal integrity purely through the narrow prism of technical, binary financial audits. The executive class routinely presents a "clean" or unmodified financial audit report from the OAG to the Council and the media as unassailable proof of absolute administrative competence and flawless transparency.

In reality, a standard financial audit merely verifies that the City's ledger sheets balance mathematically and conform to basic accounting standards. It is entirely blind to the qualitative truth of the underlying transactions. The OAG's financial tick-box cannot show whether a major commercial contract was strategically framed to favour preferred developer outcomes, or if independent financial risk models were deliberately withheld from elected councillors during budget deliberations. The administration successfully inverts the OAG's technical approval into a corporate endorsement to silence community watchdogs.

### **115. Defeating Performance Audit Alerts**

When the OAG conducts broader, sector-wide performance audits that touch upon operational inefficiencies—such as the management of corporate purchasing cards, contract extensions, or asset maintenance—the Melville executive deploys a sophisticated strategy of neutralization.

Upon the release of a critical OAG report, the administration's default position is to accept the findings in the abstract while aggressively downplaying their localized relevance. The executive class instructs internal governance teams to draft a superficial improvement plan, which is presented to the council's Audit Committee. This checklist is then managed internally behind closed doors, completely un-policed by any external umpire.

By treating the OAG's forensic alerts as minor administrative adjustments rather than deep-seated governance failures, the Melville executive ensures that its insulated monopoly over the City's multi-million dollar asset pool remains structurally untouched.

## **Summary Matrix — Office of the Auditor General (OAG)**

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 8 investigation.

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>    | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                             | <b>Systemic Reality Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                            | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                             | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                              |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Statutory Mandate</b>    | To provide independent, objective assurance on the financial health and operational efficiency of local governments. | <b>Retrospective Void</b><br>Functions strictly as a historian, evaluating systemic failures long after ratepayer funds are spent.                   | Clean financial ledgers are weaponised by the executive to claim total competence and deflect qualitative governance critiques.  | <b>OAG-DLGSC Disconnect</b><br>The DLGSC refuses to enforce OAG audit recommendations, treating them as voluntary metrics.                                     |
| <b>Enforcement Capacity</b> | Extraordinary investigative powers to compel files and expose waste, driving swift regulatory correction.            | <b>Absence of Coercive Bite</b><br>Possesses no legal authority to fine, sanction, or terminate executives who ignore audit findings.                | The administration manages critical performance alerts via un-policed, self-monitored internal checklists.                       | <b>Treasury Disconnect</b><br>Independent ratepayer revenue isolates local councils from the fiscal penalties applied to state departments.                    |
| <b>Scope of Performance</b> | Holistic auditing of operational efficiency to protect public assets from administrative waste or overreach.         | <b>Technical Filter</b><br>Financial audits track mathematical correctness while remaining blind to reporting bias or data curation.                 | Controversial asset allocations proceed to execution while the underlying economic models remain shielded from OAG scrutiny.     | <b>Integrity Blind Spot</b><br>The CCC and PSC ignore documented asset mismanagement if it falls within the CEO's administrative discretion.                   |
| <b>Resource Dynamics</b>    | Centralized, state-funded forensic auditing designed to equalize the oversight gap for ordinary citizens.            | <b>Communication Wall</b><br>Audit findings are delivered via generalized, high-level reports that citizens cannot easily leverage for local appeal. | Ratepayer-funded public relations teams reframe critical OAG sector reports as simple, routine adjustments.                      | <b>Exhaustion Engine</b><br>The multi-year gap between an administrative action and an OAG report breaks the political stamina of local watchdogs.             |
| <b>Democratic Oversight</b> | To provide elected councillors with independent financial data to execute their oversight duties under Section 2.7.  | <b>Inward Fiscal Starvation</b><br>The OAG does not provide real-time advisory support to councillors, leaving them dependent on the CEO's numbers.  | Reformist councillors are forced to vote on complex commercial portfolios without independent state-backed financial validation. | <b>Corporate Fortress</b><br>Treating the council as an independent corporate body corporate insulates executive spending from direct parliamentary oversight. |

# Chapter 9

## WA Local Government Association (WALGA) & The Institutional Shield

### 116. Statutory Standing and Intent

Unlike the state regulatory and integrity agencies examined in previous chapters, the **WA Local Government Association (WALGA)** occupies a unique and highly anomalous position within the Western Australian governance framework. WALGA is not an organ of the state, nor is it a standard public sector department. It is a body corporate established under the *Local Government Act 1995* (WA) (principally under Part 9, Division 4) to advocate for and provide services to the 130+ local governments across Western Australia.

The original legislative intent of this statutory acknowledgment was to provide a centralized mechanism to assist local authorities with bulk purchasing, manage long-service leave entitlements across the sector, and provide training for elected members. Statutorily, WALGA has zero regulatory, inspectoral, or disciplinary authority over any local government or executive officer. It is an advocacy body funded directly by municipal councils using ratepayer-derived subscription fees.

However, for decades WALGA behaviourally operated under the convenient fiction of being an independent, non-government, not-for-profit member association. By claiming it was outside the public sector proper, WALGA successfully kept its internal files, written advice to councils, procurement contracts, and strategic lobbying efforts hidden from the public, journalists, and reformist councillors. This allowed it to function under a veil of total corporate opacity while deriving its entire operational lifespan from public ratepayer funds.

### 117. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness

The profound systemic weakness that WALGA introduces into the oversight ecosystem stems from a fundamental, unaddressed conflict of interest: it functions simultaneously as a publicly funded body and a private employer union dedicated to protecting the autonomy and authority of local government executives.

### 118. Employer Union Dynamic

Because WALGA's primary constituency consists of the local government corporate entities themselves—frequently directed and represented by the executive management class—its structural alignment is naturally defensive of the bureaucracy. WALGA functions effectively as an elite industrial and political shield for municipal administrations. When community groups or reformist councillors attempt to introduce stricter measures of external accountability, WALGA leverages its collective political power to lobby the State Government against any reforms that might dilute the executive's broad administrative discretion or dismantle the CEO information monopoly.

### 119. Training and Indoctrination Monopoly

One of WALGA's most powerful structural levers is its near-monopoly over the delivery of mandatory councillor training modules, which are outsourced to the association by the DLGSC. This arrangement creates a significant governance conflict:

- **The Compliance Narrative:** Rather than training newly elected councillors to act as rigorous, adversarial representatives who cross-examine the bureaucracy under Section 2.7 of the Act, WALGA's educational modules prioritize a culture of passive compliance.
- **The Separation Filter:** Councillors are systematically taught that their role is strictly limited to high-level, abstract "strategic planning," while the CEO holds an absolute, untouchable mandate over all operational and administrative matters. This training actively discourages councillors from demanding raw, unfiltered financial data or querying the directional bias of executive reports, framing such basic due diligence as an inappropriate breach of operational boundaries.

## **120. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Protection Matrix**

WALGA sits at the absolute centre of the personnel pipeline, forming a protective matrix that systematically neutralizes external integrity threats. This matrix has been dramatically consolidated with the appointment of **Tony Brown**—who served WALGA for nearly 20 years, most recently as Executive Director of Member Services—as Western Australia's inaugural independent Local Government Inspector.

## **121. The Apex of the Revolving Door**

The appointment of a 40-year sector insider directly from the peak employer union to the supreme regulatory inspectorate represents the complete neutralization of adversarial distance. The fundamental prerequisite of effective regulation is distance between the umpire and the players. With this appointment, that distance disappears.

When a community watchdog or reformist councillor submits a complaint regarding complex administrative overreach, it will be evaluated by an Inspector who possesses deeply embedded, decades-long professional relationships with the very local government CEOs being complained about. The psychological and cultural bias of the Regulator is structurally hardwired to view systemic public complaints through the defensive lens of sector protection.

## **122. Institutionalisation of the Compliance Narrative**

This appointment means that the state's primary new enforcement weapon is led by the very individual who previously spent decades managing WALGA's governance advice, member services, and training programs. There is an extreme structural risk that the Inspectorate's operational culture will simply mirror WALGA's defensive posture. The regulator's view of good governance is likely to remain tethered to the same boilerplate, tick-box compliance templates co-designed by WALGA during the Inspector's previous tenure.

## **123. Co-optation of the Reform Agenda**

The state government's creation of the independent Inspectorate was marketed to the public as a landmark reform to clean up council dysfunction. However, by staffing this supreme independent office with the ultimate sector insider, the architecture achieves complete systemic insulation. The state has successfully captured the accountability mechanism itself. Any structural intervention, panel of monitors, or behavioural investigation launched by the Inspectorate will operate under an invisible operational boundary: it will readily penalize the overt, public behavioural infractions of individual elected councillors, but it is structurally and culturally disincentivised from penetrating the sophisticated corporate shields of the unelected executive class.

#### **124. Bidirectional Lobbying and Systemic Co-optation of State Watchdogs**

WALGA's role is not confined to passive, one-way lobbying of the State Government; rather, it actively engages in bidirectional advocacy and strategic co-optation directly targeting, and occasionally defending, the state's primary oversight bodies. By inserting itself into the operational guidelines and public narratives of the regulators, WALGA blurs the line between the independent watchdogs and the municipal executive class. This active co-optation manifests across three specific oversight layers:

#### **125. Co-Authoring Regulatory Guidelines with the PSC and Ombudsman**

WALGA does not merely react to Public Sector Commission (PSC) or Ombudsman standards—it actively co-authors them. When the state updates critical localized governance mechanisms, such as the *CEO Recruitment, Selection, Performance Review and Termination Standards*, the guidelines are formally developed via collaborative working groups. WALGA sits directly at the drafting table alongside the PSC and the Ombudsman. This collaborative architecture ensures that the PSC's minor misconduct and performance frameworks are pre-filtered through WALGA's protective lens before they are ever implemented. The peak body ensures that the language of these standards preserves the "administrative discretion" of the executive class, neutralizing any sharp, adversarial compliance hooks before the guidelines leave the state printer.

#### **126. Intercepting and Neutralising the Auditor General (OAG)**

When the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) exercises its independent mandate to expose systemic municipal failures, WALGA actively steps in to run public relations interference and mitigate the damage on behalf of its member executives. Following the OAG's forensic reports exposing widespread deficiencies in municipal operations—such as reports into the management of corporate purchasing cards—WALGA immediately deploys its media apparatus. The WALGA President routinely issues formal public counter-narratives to aggressively downplay the OAG's findings, publicly stating that the testing found no evidence of explicit misuse of public money, and attempting to decouple the failures from any systemic culture of entitlement. Concurrently, WALGA actively lobbies the OAG to reform the municipal audit process itself, utilizing its collective political weight to soften the financial audit parameters applied to local councils.

#### **127. Historic Lobbying for the "Behavioural" Displacement Chute**

WALGA was historically instrumental in lobbying the State Government to shift the entire focus of local government discipline away from corporate administrative structures and onto individual elected members.

Beginning as early as 2002, WALGA actively campaigned for the introduction of official "Elected Member Conduct" legislation, explicitly lobbying for powers that would enable the state to take disciplinary action against individual councillors rather than suspending an entire Council. While marketed as a tool to prevent council dismissals, this decades-long lobbying campaign successfully engineered the behavioural obsession that currently cripples the DLGSC and the Local Government Inspectorate. WALGA successfully convinced the state to build an entire regulatory apparatus designed to police the tone, conduct, and interpersonal bickering of politicians, ensuring that the structural grey zone corruption of process, procedure, policy, and law executed by unelected executives remains completely un-policed.

### **128. Impact of Judicial Intervention on WALGA's Agency Status**

The historical opacity of this matrix was severely challenged by a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (*Local Government Elected Members Association (WA) Inc v WA Local Government Association*). The Court determined that WALGA is legally an "agency" and a "public body" for the purposes of the *Freedom of Information Act 1992* (WA).

### **129. How This Ruling Strengthens the Dossier's Thesis**

Far from showing that external oversight is organically strong, the historical context of this intense court battle profoundly validates and deepens the core thesis of this entire dossier:

- **Proof of Inherent Structural Resistance:** The fact that an independent group of elected members had to mount a costly, multi-year Supreme Court appeal to force WALGA to open its books proves that the peak body is structurally designed to resist transparency. WALGA did not willingly adopt an open, accountable public sector ethos; it fiercely defended its secrecy through previous Information Commissioner hearings until it was dragged into the light by external judicial intervention.
- **Dismantling the Private Union Shield:** Now that WALGA is legally bound by the FOI Act, a major crack has appeared in its corporate shield. For the first time, community watchdogs and councillors can look directly behind the curtain to examine the un-redacted advisory work, minutes, and legal templates WALGA distributes to executive monopolies.
- **The Exposure of Process and Policy Corruption:** This court victory provides an extraordinary tool for analysis. It means the sub-criminal administrative manoeuvres engineered between local government CEOs and WALGA can no longer be hidden under the guise of private commercial confidentiality. It transforms WALGA from an un-auditable private fortress into an entity whose public affairs are legally open to the same public scrutiny as the councils it represents.

### **130. City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, WALGA's role as an institutional shield transforms from abstract political lobbying into an active tool used to neutralize local public dissent.

### **131. Institutional Shield Against Local Inquiry**

Historical patterns show that when the City of Melville faced sustained community criticism over major commercial rezonings, land divestments, and the systemic curation of executive reports, community groups frequently petitioned the Minister for a formal, independent Panel Inquiry under Part 8 of the Act.

During these high-pressure periods, WALGA's overarching sector policy framework served as a vital corporate defence layer for the Melville executive. WALGA consistently advocates that municipal governance issues should be handled through internal mediation, self-regulation, and "capacity building" rather than disruptive state-led inquiries. This sector-wide solidarity effectively reinforces a protective corporate shield around the Melville administration, framing legitimate civic watchdogs as external threats to the operational autonomy of the municipality.

### 132. Validation via Boilerplate Compliance

The Melville executive has historically relied on WALGA-approved templates, governance models, and legal advice to justify controversial administrative decisions. If the City implements an internal policy that restricts community access—such as an aggressive Unreasonable Complainant protocol—it can defend the action by demonstrating that the policy aligns perfectly with WALGA’s standardized sector templates.

Because the policy matches the peak body's blueprint, the DLGSC accepts it as compliant, completely ignoring whether the local application of that template is being weaponized to silence critics and suppress the democratic intent of Section 1.3(2). With WALGA's internal operations now subject to the FOI Act via the Supreme Court's ruling, the true corporate origin of these restrictive templates can finally be subjected to un-filtered public scrutiny.

## Summary Matrix — WA Local Government Association (WALGA)

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 9 investigation.

| Diagnostic Vector    | Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)                                                                                                         | Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)                                                                                                                                                | Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)                                                                                          | Inter-Agency Intersections                                                                                                                                                                 |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Statutory Standing   | A service association established to assist councils with procurement, long service leave, and member training.                           | <b>Protected Union</b><br>Functions as a heavily funded employer union and political lobby group dedicated to preserving local executive autonomy.                                 | Relies on WALGA policy frameworks to resist independent external inquiries, framing public dissent as an attack on municipal autonomy. | <b>Supreme Court Crack</b><br>The landmark ruling legally strips WALGA of its private fiction, binding it to the FOI Act as a public agency.                                               |
| Councillor Education | To train elected representatives to perform rigorous statutory due diligence and oversee executive performance under <b>Section 2.7</b> . | <b>Compliance Narrative</b><br>Outsourced training modules indoctrinate councillors into passive roles, teaching them that challenging administrative reports breaches boundaries. | Newly elected councillors are culturally conditioned to accept pre-packaged executive reports without demanding underlying raw data.   | <b>DLGSC Training Out-sourcing</b><br>The DLGSC completely abdicates its educational role, allowing a private advocacy body to control the narrative of what constitutes proper oversight. |

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>      | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                       | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                                                   | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                                            | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                                                                    |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Regulatory Separation</b>  | Total independence and adversarial distance between the regulatory umpire and the regulated entities.          | <b>Ultimate Apex Door</b><br>The appointment of former WALGA Executive Director Tony Brown as independent Inspector completely erases regulatory distance.                   | Complaints regarding Melville's administrative report curation are evaluated by an Inspectorate led by a veteran insider with deep sector ties. | <b>Inspectorate Capture</b><br>Staffing the supreme new oversight office with a WALGA figure guarantees that enforcement fixates on councillor behaviour while leaving executive power untouched.    |
| <b>Policy Standardisation</b> | To provide optional, best-practice policy templates to improve administrative efficiency across the sector.    | <b>The Boilerplate Shield</b><br>Standardised templates are used to create a facade of legal compliance, hiding highly restrictive and defensive administrative practices.   | The executive deploys "Unreasonable Complainant" frameworks based on WALGA templates to justify locking out community critics.                  | <b>DLGSC Template Endorsement</b><br>The DLGSC accepts WALGA-derived policies as proof of compliance, refusing to examine how those policies are weaponised locally.                                 |
| <b>Regulator Co-optation</b>  | Independent state watchdogs setting robust, objective benchmarks to police the local government public sector. | <b>Bidirectional Capture</b><br>WALGA actively inserts itself to co-author PSC/Ombudsman guidelines, softening compliance hooks and running PR defence against OAG findings. | Melville's executive confidently deploys internal CEO management rules, knowing they were co-drafted by WALGA to maximize executive discretion. | <b>OAG and PSC Blunting</b><br>WALGA lobbies the OAG to weaken financial audit parameters and utilizes the behavioural displacement chute to keep the regulatory focus away from process corruption. |

# Chapter 10:

## The Office of the Western Australian Ombudsman & The Administrative Mirage

### 133. Statutory Mandate and Intent

Under the *Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971* (WA), the **Office of the Western Australian Ombudsman** is established as an independent officer of the Parliament. The foundational statutory intent of the Ombudsman is to serve as the supreme parliamentary mechanism for investigating the administrative actions, decisions, and procedures of public authorities, which explicitly encompasses local government entities.

The legislative philosophy underpinning the Ombudsman framework is to provide ordinary citizens with a free, accessible, and independent avenue of redress when they have been subjected to administrative injustice, systemic unfairness, or unlawful bureaucratic actions.

The Ombudsman is granted extensive, court-like powers to compel the production of documents, summon witnesses, and enter premises to uncover the truth behind public administration. Statutorily, the framework is designed to ensure that administrative decision-making remains lawful, reasonable, just, and transparent, acting as a crucial democratic counterweight to the immense power wielded by unelected public bureaucracies.

### 134. Structural Architecture and Systemic Weakness

When applied to the local government sector, the operational mechanics of the Ombudsman reveal a profound architectural limitation. Rather than acting as a proactive shield that pierces corporate secrecy and dismantles executive monopolies, the framework is heavily constrained by its strict separation of administrative form from behavioural intent, and its total reliance on non-coercive recommendations.

### 135. Procedural Correctness Trap (Merits vs. Process)

The definitive operational limitation of the Ombudsman layer is its structural focus on surface-level procedural correctness. When a ratepayer challenges a local government action, the Ombudsman reviews whether the council followed its own policies, met statutory deadlines, and completed the mandated paperwork.

Sophisticated local government executives treat this narrow focus as an effective shield. An administration can easily generate a perfect paper trail—ensuring all boxes are ticked, formal notifications are sent, and standard templates are used—while the underlying decision remains deeply compromised. The Ombudsman's methodology is structurally blind to the hidden cultural corruption, executive pressure, or deliberate filtering of data that dictated the creation of those documents in the first place. If the paperwork appears technically complete, the Ombudsman concludes there was no administrative error.

### 136. Non-Binding Recommendation Model

The ultimate failure of the Ombudsman as a regulatory force stems from its complete lack of enforcement teeth. Unlike a court of law, the Ombudsman cannot set aside a council decision, issue binding injunctions, or penalize non-compliant executives.

- **The Advisory Wall:** At the conclusion of a lengthy investigation, the Ombudsman's powers are strictly limited to issuing a report and making recommendations to the local authority.
- **The Executive Option:** Because these recommendations carry no direct legal penalties, a sophisticated executive class can comfortably accept the report in public while quietly burying, delaying, or altering the implementation of the corrections behind closed doors, secure in the knowledge that the Ombudsman cannot enforce compliance.

### **137. Inter-Agency Relationships and the Fragmented Shield**

The rigid boundaries separating the Ombudsman from the state's primary integrity and anti-corruption bodies create an uncoordinated, fragmented environment that local executives easily exploit.

### **138. Ombudsman-PSC Boundary Split**

The oversight network features a strict, binary boundary that separates administrative procedure (managed by the Ombudsman) from employee conduct (managed by the Public Sector Commission). If a local government issues a highly contentious administrative order or locks a ratepayer out of correspondence, the Ombudsman reviews only whether the administrative policy was applied correctly on paper.

If that exact same decision was engineered by an executive director or CEO acting with personal, un-declared bias, that behavioural element shifts exclusively to the PSC's jurisdiction. Because the two agencies are completely siloed and possess no structural mechanism to combine data or conduct joint operations, the investigation is sliced into separate pieces. The Ombudsman looks only at the passive administrative output, while the PSC applies its devolved architecture and refers the behavioural input right back to the CEO for self-investigation, leaving the unelected executive monopoly completely untouched.

### **139. Defensive Validation Loop**

This horizontal divide allows a sophisticated council executive to successfully defeat both investigations simultaneously. If the Ombudsman conducts a surface-level review and finds a decision procedurally sound, the local executive instantly seizes upon that finding. The CEO simply points to the Ombudsman's clean procedural bill of health to convince the PSC or the DLGSC that the entire administrative process was flawless. The Ombudsman's procedural review is effectively converted into a powerful corporate endorsement, forcing other integrity bodies to permanently close their files.

### **140. City of Melville as a Case Study**

When examined through records and governance themes concerning the City of Melville, the structural limitations of the Ombudsman framework function as an active tool used to neutralize public complaints and insulate the executive from accountability.

### **141. Absorption of Systemic Grievances**

Historical patterns indicate that when Melville residents or independent oversight advocates file alerts regarding administrative overreach, unfair localized policies, or the tactical withholding of documents, these complaints are absorbed into a protracted review pipeline.

Because the Ombudsman operates on a reactive, desk-bound model with extensive backlogs, investigations frequently take many months to conclude. By the time a complaint

is evaluated, the administrative reality is locked in—the land has been rezoned, the asset has been divested, or the ratepayer has faced months of bureaucratic isolation. The temporal lag transforms the Ombudsman track into an exhaustion engine that drains the stamina of the community watchdogs.

#### **142. Weaponisation of Procedural Cleanliness**

The Melville context demonstrates how an executive can utilize basic compliance paperwork to deflect intense public scrutiny. When community watchdogs compile comprehensive briefs highlighting systemic bias in how the administration handles localized infrastructure disputes or developer proximity, the executive class relies on its internal governance teams to demonstrate that all statutory steps were technically met on paper.

The Ombudsman, bound by its procedural parameters, is forced to accept these packaged assurances at face value. The City's executive then uses the Ombudsman's eventual dismissal of the complaint as an official, merits-based state exoneration, mischaracterizing a narrow jurisdictional finding of "procedural compliance" as an absolute validation of their administrative integrity and fairness.

## Summary Matrix — Chapter 10: Western Australian Ombudsman

This table synthesises the values, systemic issues, and case realities uncovered in the Chapter 10 investigation.

| <b>Diagnostic Vector</b>            | <b>Statutory Ideal (Value / Purpose)</b>                                                                  | <b>Systemic Reality (Structural Issue)</b>                                                                                                  | <b>Case Manifestation (City of Melville Reality)</b>                                                                       | <b>Inter-Agency Intersections</b>                                                                                                                     |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Statutory Mandate</b>            | Independent parliamentary mechanism ensuring public administrative actions are just, fair, and lawful.    | <b>Procedural Filter</b><br>Evaluates only surface-level compliance, remaining blind to hidden executive bias or data curation.             | Flawless paper trails are used by the executive to shield controversial administrative decisions from qualitative review.  | <b>Ombudsman-PSC Split</b><br>The Ombudsman reviews the administrative output while the PSC delegates behavioural inputs back to the CEO.             |
| <b>Enforcement Capacity</b>         | High-level coercive powers to compel truth and drive swift, binding correction of public injustices.      | <b>Advisory Illusion</b><br>Possesses zero authority to reverse decisions or penalize non-compliant executives; limited to recommendations. | The executive class manages critical reports via internal public relations shielding and protracted implementation delays. | <b>Validation Loop</b><br>The CEO weaponises clean procedural findings from the Ombudsman to force the PSC to close minor misconduct files.           |
| <b>Operational Efficacy</b>         | Accessible, dynamic, and timely dispute resolution protecting citizens from bureaucratic overreach.       | <b>Temporal Exhaustion</b><br>Severe operational backlogs delay administrative reviews until after decisions are entirely irreversible.     | Long-standing ratepayer grievances regarding localized policies are absorbed into a lengthy bureaucratic void.             | <b>DLGSC Passing of the Parcel</b><br>The DLGSC treats administrative fairness strictly as an Ombudsman matter, refusing to audit structural secrecy. |
| <b>Public Trust &amp; Oversight</b> | Absolute transparency that opens up hidden administrative processes to public and parliamentary scrutiny. | <b>Form Over Substance Bias</b><br>Accepts pre-packaged corporate assurances if they conform to the literal text of local council policies. | Restrictive communication bans and lockout protocols are justified by showing they match standardized templates.           | <b>Complete Insulation</b><br>The separation of administrative law from behavioural integrity law ensures process corruption remains un-policed.      |

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- **Contaminated Sites Act 2003 (WA)**
- **Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA)**
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- **Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA)**
- **Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA)**
- **Local Government Act 1995 (WA)**
- **Local Government Amendment (Auditing) Act 2017 (WA)**
- **Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1971 (WA)**
- **Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)**
- **Public Health Act 2016 (WA)**
- **Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA)**
- **State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA)**
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